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MEASURING THE TRUE COST OF 
GOVERNMENT BAILOUT 
CHERYL D. BLOCK

 
 Government intervention to assist individual businesses and industries 
during the 2008–2009 economic crisis was extraordinary in variety and 
scope. Despite official protestations of ―no more bailout‖ in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, future 
government interventions are inevitable, should economic circumstances 
become sufficiently dire. Moreover, even if Congress eliminates overt 
bailout-type interventions, indirect forms of public bailout are likely to 
continue. Understandably, taxpayers have been concerned about the cost. 
A simple tally of dollars authorized or disbursed is wholly inadequate to 
accurately assess the costs of various interventions. This Article addresses 
the challenges of providing reasonable budgetary information with respect 
to different types of bailout expenditures. In addition to looking at costs 
for the more obvious bailout programs, the analysis explores the special 
cost estimation challenges for other more covert actions, such as special 
tax breaks or relief from burdensome regulation, that serve a "bailout" 
function. The Article also takes issue with the fragmentation of 
intervention efforts among different ―on-budget‖ and ―off-budget‖ entities 
and with some of the methodologies used by the government to value 
assets obtained in its bailout efforts, arguing that decision making about 
the appropriate allocation of aggregate resources is hampered when some 
expenditures are ―off-budget‖ altogether and when even ―on-budget‖ 
agencies use different accounting methods. Finally, the Article calls for 
transparency and budget accounting for public bailouts accomplished 
more indirectly through the tax system and other regulatory regimes. 
Adequate and transparent budget accounting for bailout costs requires 
greater consistency in valuation and accounting methods, and a more 
unified presentation of aggregate information in the budget with respect to 
all government bailout-type activities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY 
A. Introduction 
When the American Dialect Society tallied votes for its nineteenth 
annual ―word of the year,‖ the clear victor for 2008 was ―bailout.‖1 The 
economic crisis that began in 2007 and escalated through 2009 led even 
those who are ordinarily free-market purists to concede the need for 
government intervention. Not since the Great Depression had the United 
States experienced such a severe economic downturn affecting virtually all 
sectors of the economy.
2
  
Although the extent and variety of recent government bailouts have 
been extraordinary, the ―bailout phenomenon‖ is nothing new. History 
offers numerous illustrations of government intervention to assist 
individual businesses in financial distress, including the Chrysler 
Corporation,
3
 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
4
 New York City,
5
 Penn 
Central, and other struggling northeastern railroads.
6
 Congress has also 
provided industry-wide assistance, including legislation to aid the airline 
 
 
 1. Press Release, Am. Dialect Soc‘y, ―Bailout‖ Voted 2008 Word of the Year by American 
Dialect Society (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://www.americandialect.org/2008-Word-of-the-Year-
PRESS-RELEASE.pdf. 
 2. After meeting by conference call on November 28, 2008, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization, officially declared that the 
domestic economy had been in recession since December 2007. NAT‘L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf. According to the NBER, ―[a] recession is a significant decline in 
economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real 
GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.‖ NAT‘L BUREAU OF 
ECON. RESEARCH, THE NBER‘S RECESSION DATING PROCEDURE (2003), available at http://www. 
nber.org/cycles/recessions.html. By conference call on September 19, 2010, the NBER officially 
determined that the recession ended in June 2009 and declared it the longest of any recession since 
World War II. NAT‘L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE (2010), 
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html. 
 3. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980). 
 4. Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971). Although this Act 
was general in scope, its passage was motivated by the financial problems of the Lockheed Aircraft 
Corporation. H.R. REP. NO. 92-379, at 1272 (1971). 
 5. New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460; New York 
City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797. 
 6. See, e.g., The Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-663, 84 Stat. 1975 
(providing federal loan guarantees to bankrupt railroads); Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 301, 87 Stat. 985, 1004 (1974) (creating Conrail as a private, government-
sponsored corporation to provide railroad services); see also Reg‘l Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 
102 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973); Id. at 109 
n.3 (listing individual bankrupt railroads); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Ask and Ye Shall Receive: The 
Legislative Responses to the Northeast Rail Crisis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 271 (1983).  
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industry, hard hit by the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks.
7
 Until the 
most recent bailouts, perhaps the most costly industry-wide government 
intervention in modern memory was the savings and loan bailout in the 
late 1980s.
8
  
As events evolved in 2008 and 2009, voters became increasingly angry 
about lax regulatory oversight of Wall Street and the escalating cost of 
government-funded bailouts.
9
 This Article focuses on issues related to 
providing accurate cost assessments and budget accounting for bailouts in 
general and for recent bailouts in particular. Congress has since passed the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
10
 
This historic financial regulatory reform bill begins with a preamble 
declaring a firm purpose to ―end ‗too big to fail‘‖ and ―to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts.‖11 With this legislation, Congress 
announced that there will be no more government-funded rescues of 
private industry. At the same time, the legislation seeks to preventor at 
least mitigatepotential future economic crises by providing government 
―authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant 
risk to the financial stability of the United States.‖12 Expenses incurred in 
connection with the government‘s orderly liquidation authority are not to 
be paid from general revenues, but instead from a new ―orderly liquidation 
 
 
 7. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 
(2001); see also Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 
IND. L. REV. 367 (2003); Tara Branum & Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and Bailouts: Aviation 
and the Return of Big Government, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 431 (2002). 
 8. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 Stat. 183; see also BAIRD WEBEL, N. ERIC WEISS & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RS22956, THE COST OF GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS, PAST AND PRESENT 6 (2008) 
(reporting a $150 billion final cost to the Treasury Department for the savings and loan bailouts). 
 9. Media coverage of congressional financial regulatory reform debates often referred to public 
anger over bailouts, Wall Street, and government regulators. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Democrats Seize 
on Oversight, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, at A1 (referring to increased confidence among Democrats 
about prospects for financial regulatory reform given ―voter anger at big banks and bailouts‖); Jim 
Puzzanghera, Debate Begins on Final Overhaul Reform, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 2010, at C31 (quoting 
Rep. Paul Kanjorski as saying, ―[f]eelings of anger, frustration and rage justifiably hang over this 
proceeding because of the recklessness of financial whiz kids, the greediness of Wall Street bankers 
and the shortsightedness of our economic regulators‖). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. Congress‘s recent passage of this Act was a remarkable 
political and policy achievement, which—among many other things—provided new consumer 
protections, id. tit. X, and reforms to increase Wall Street transparency and accountability, id. tit. VII. 
The Act was signed into law just as this Article entered final editing. The voluminous Act covers many 
areas that are beyond the scope of this Article. Aspects of the legislation that are significant to the 
discussion are considered briefly throughout the Article. See also discussion infra Part VI. 
 11. Id. (preamble). 
 12. Id. tit. II, § 204(a). The legislation provides detailed procedures for making a formal 
―systemic risk determination,‖ id. § 203, and a court order appointing the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. Id. § 202. 
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fund‖ to be maintained by the Treasury Department for the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
13
 For purposes of this fund, the 
FDIC has authority to borrow by issuing obligations.
14
 To ensure that 
funds necessary to repay these obligations not be taken from general 
revenue, the legislation gives the FDIC further authority to impose a risk-
based assessment on large bank holding companies and nonbank financial 
companies under supervision of the Federal Reserve Bank.
15
 Lest there be 
any doubt, Congress also included an explicit declaration that ―taxpayers 
shall bear no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title.‖16 
As he signed the Wall Street Reform legislation, President Obama asserted 
that ―because of this law, the American people will never again be asked 
to foot the bill for Wall Street‘s mistakes. There will be no more tax-
funded bailouts—period.‖17 
If such legislative and executive branch claims of ―no more taxpayer-
funded bailout‖ are accurate, one might think that the budgetary 
accounting issues addressed in this Article are moot. Yet, bailout cost 
measurement concerns remain relevant for several reasons. If nothing else, 
the public is entitled to some reasonable assessment of how much has 
already been spent for bailout-type government interventions. In addition, 
federal loan and loan guarantee programs for struggling small businesses 
are likely to continue as an important part of our economic landscape. 
And, the government continues to hold conservatorship interests in 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the value of which should 
be monitored for budgetary purposes.
18
 More importantly, political ―no 
more bailout‖ assertionseven those ultimately included in statutory 
textsimply are not credible as precommitment devices. Statutory 
declarations can always be amended. As much as Congress would like to 
eliminate any ―too-big-to-fail‖ policy, the reality is that there mayand 
probably willcome a time when the failure of a particular firm or 
industry would be so economically devastating that Congress would step 
in to save it, despite earlier protestations to the contrary.
19
 In addition, the 
 
 
 13. Id. § 210(n) (establishing an ―Orderly Liquidation Fund‖). 
 14. Id. § 210(n)(5). 
 15. Id. § 210(o) (providing for risk-based assessments on bank holding companies with total 
consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 billion and on certain nonbank financial companies). 
 16. Id. § 214(c). 
 17. Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 (July 21, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 18. See infra notes 24–25, 89–94, 175–82 and accompanying text. 
 19. For similar observations, see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4–5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/3
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legislative orderly liquidation procedures are limited to financial 
companies, insurance companies, and certain brokers and dealers.
20
 Thus, 
the legislation does not apply to potential bailouts of the automotive 
industry, airlines, or any other companies or industries whose failure 
might create systemic risk. Perhaps most importantly, the reform 
legislation does not address the many ways in which Congress provides 
potentially costly bailout-type relief through indirect or covert 
interventions. 
This Article explores the challenges involved in providing reasonably 
accurate budgetary information with respect to different types of overt and 
covert bailout expenditures. Despite the challenges, it is important that 
every effort be made to record the budgetary impact of each type of 
government intervention as accurately as possible. As one analyst recently 
noted, 
[i]t will be critical to economic recovery and the long-term health of 
our financial system that we allocate money to the different rescue 
programs in a way that maximizes the ―bang for the buck[,]‖ [which 
is] best done by comparing the expected costs of various programs, 
rather than focusing on their maximum possible losses.
21
 
A reasonable assessment of the relative costs of different approaches is 
essential to enable legislators, administrators, and regulators to make 
informed policy choices about the best use and allocation of resources. 
Finally, reasonable estimation of the costs of various ―rescue‖ efforts is 
important if overall budgetary information is to reflect a reasonably 
accurate picture of the nation‘s overall short- and long-term fiscal health.  
In addition to analyzing cost assessment challenges presented by the 
more obvious bailout programs, this Article explores the special cost 
estimation challenges for other, more covert, actions that serve a ―bailout‖ 
function. Part II will first briefly address the distinction between bailout 
and stimulus and misconceptions about the ways in which government 
economic rescue efforts may or may not impose costs on the general 
taxpaying public. Part III identifies concerns with ―off-budget‖ bailout-
type expenditures and considers the proper location in the federal budget 
 
 
id=1548787 (―Bailouts are an inevitable feature of modern economies, where the interconnectedness 
of firms means that the entire economy bears the risk of individual firms‘ failure. . . . Any prefixed 
resolution regime will be abandoned whenever it cannot provide acceptable distributional outcome. In 
such cases, bailouts are inevitable.‖). 
 20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 204, 205, 124 Stat. 1376, 1454–58. 
 21. DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., MEASURING THE COST OF THE TARP 7 (2009). 
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for reporting various types of government bailout interventions. One 
question considered in this Part, for example, is the proper budgetary 
treatment of Federal Reserve, as opposed to Treasury Department, bailout-
type actions. Part IV considers budgetary challenges in proper accounting 
and cost estimation for different types of overt government bailouts. 
Finally, Part V explores similar questions with respect to more covert 
bailouts.  
For purposes of this Article, my working definition of ―bailout‖ is one 
that I developed in my earlier work: ―a form of government assistance or 
intervention specifically designed or intended to assist enterprises facing 
financial distress and to prevent enterprise failure.‖22 This working 
definition does not include government assistance to individuals facing 
economic distress. Although there certainly are overlaps in the types of 
budgetary issues raised in the business and personal settings, my focus is 
on government intervention to assist financial or business entities. 
B. Brief History of Recent Events 
Public awareness of the recent downward economic spiral perhaps 
became most widespread in March 2008, with dramatic reports of 
emergency meetings at which the then Treasury secretary Henry Paulson, 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke, and other officials 
assisted in brokering J.P. Morgan‘s acquisition of Bear Stearnsa deal 
that would not have closed without the New York Federal Reserve‘s 
guarantee to absorb $29 billion in losses on Bear Stearns‘ riskiest assets.23 
In July 2008, as housing and financial markets declined, the Treasury 
Department successfully sought congressional authority to seize control of 
troubled mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
24
 By 
September 2008, the federal government held Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in conservatorship and had itself become a preferred shareholder.
25
 At 
 
 
 22. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. 
L.J. 951, 960 (1992) [hereinafter Block, Bailouts]. 
 23. Details of the transaction were reported by the Federal Reserve in Legal Developments: 
Second Quarter, 2008, FED. RES. BULL., Aug. 2008, at 73, 78–81; see also GARY SHORTER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34420, BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND ―RESCUE‖ FOR A MAJOR PROVIDER OF 
MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS (2008). For Treasury Secretary Paulson‘s personal perspective, see 
HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 90–121 (2010).  
 24. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1117, 122 Stat. 2654, 
2683–88. 
 25. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on 
Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers 
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about the same time, the Federal Reserve authorized a loan of up to $85 
billion to stave off the imminent collapse of American International Group 
(AIG), the nation‘s largest insurance company, and took warrants that, if 
converted into common stock, would give the government an 
approximately 80% equity interest in the insurance giant.
26
 Shortly 
thereafter, the Federal Reserve expanded its assistance to AIG, authorizing 
a cash infusion of up to an additional $37.8 billion, in exchange for AIG 
securities through a newly created Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF) 
and another $14 billion through another new facility, the Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
27
 Further assistance followed when the 
Federal Reserve created special entities, referred to as ―special purpose 
vehicles‖ or SPVs, for the sole purpose of acquiring AIG troubled assets.28 
By late September 2008, it had become clear to members of both 
parties that more systemic intervention was needed. In response to the 
Treasury Department‘s request for greater authority, Congress enacted the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA),
29
 creating a new 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
30
 which quickly became 
popularly referred to as the ―$700 billion bailout.‖31 In addition to direct 
 
 
(Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm; see also N. ERIC WEISS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34661, FANNIE MAE‘S AND FREDDIE MAC‘S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2008). For further discussion of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
takeover and its budget implications, see infra notes 182–88 and accompanying text. 
 26. For a detailed description of the Federal Reserve Loan to AIG, see BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL 
GROUP (AIG) (2009); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008).  
 27. BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) 5 (2009). Provisions in the 2010 Wall Street Reform Act 
create a new loan guarantee program to provide emergency financial stability to solvent depository 
institutions, but the guarantee ―may not include the provision of equity in any form.‖ Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1105, 124 Stat. 1376, 
2121–25. 
 28. BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40438, ONGOING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) 7–8 (2009). 
 29. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261).  
 30. Id. tit. I, §§ 101–136 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241). Originally scheduled to 
expire on December 31, 2009, TARP was extended through October 3, 2010, pursuant to EESA 
authority granted to the Treasury Secretary. Id. § 120(b). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the 
Treasury, Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner to Hill Leadership on 
Administration‘s Exit Strategy for TARP (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://financialstability.gov/latest 
/pr_12092009. html. 
 31. EESA authorized the Treasury Department to establish an Office of Financial Stability (OFS) 
to purchase troubled assets using three ―tranches‖ of funding totaling $700 billion. Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §§ 101(a), 115(a). The $700 billion total authority was 
subsequently reduced by $1.24 billion to offset the costs of program changes. See Helping Families 
Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 202(b), 123 Stat. 1632, 1643. TARP authority 
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assistance from the Federal Reserve, AIG also benefitted from the TARP 
program, through which the Treasury Department purchased $40 billion in 
preferred AIG stock and extended a $30 billion line of credit.
32
  
The economic crisis was not limited to financial industries. Faced with 
a twenty-six-year low in sales, automobile industry executives lobbied 
heavily in September 2008 for $25 billion in immediate direct federal 
loans.
33
 When Congress failed to authorize loans through the 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA),
34
 the Bush administration instead 
assisted the auto industry through a new Automotive Industry Financing 
Program (AIFP) created under the TARP umbrella.
35
  
A concerned public began tallying the remarkable bailout costs to the 
taxpayer: a $700 billion TARP program, $29 billion in financing for the 
Bear Stearns acquisition, $85 billion and counting to AIG, and still more 
for the automobile industry.
36
 As the saying goes, add all this together and, 
pretty soon, you‘re talking about real money. Some headlines declared, 
―Total Bailout Cost Heads Towards $5 Trillion.‖37 Others placed the 
 
 
was later further reduced to $475 billion. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 § 1302.  
 32. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2010 
TO 2020, at 12–13 (2010); see also U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: STATUS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG (2009). 
 33. STEPHEN COONEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40003, U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE 
INDUSTRY: FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESTRUCTURING 1 (2009); Frank Ahrens, Ailing 
Auto Industry Sends in Its Pitchman: CEO of GM Leads Lobby of Lawmakers for Loans, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 12, 2008, at D1. 
 34. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 136, 121 Stat. 1492, 
1514–16. Explaining and describing the Energy Independence Act, as amended, the House Agriculture 
Committee reported that the act‘s loan and loan guarantee programs were designed to assist auto 
manufacturers with the costs of acquiring fuel-efficient parts and developing advanced vehicle 
technology systems. H.R. REP. NO. 110-933, at 42–44 (2009). As one report stated, ―[t]his program 
has been widely misinterpreted as a broad ‗bailout‘ . . . [but] the language in these laws indicates the 
intent of Congress that the loans are for the purpose of enabling the U.S. auto industry to produce more 
fuel-efficient vehicles.‖ STEPHEN COONEY & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34743, FEDERAL LOANS TO THE AUTO INDUSTRY UNDER THE ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND 
SECURITY ACT 1 (2008). Congress rejected use of EISA funds for the auto industry bailout. Auto 
Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, H.R. 7321, 110th Cong. (2d Sess. 2008) (passed by the 
House, but never adopted by the Senate). 
 35. As described by the OFS, the objective of the Automotive Industry Financing Program was 
―to help prevent a significant disruption of the American automotive industry, which would have 
posed a systemic risk to financial market stability and had a negative effect on the economy.‖ OFFICE 
OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, 
at 33 (2009); see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP 
FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 6 (2009) 
(reporting the broadening of TARP activities). 
 36. Costs of loans and other types of financial assistance to the auto makers are incorporated in 
TARP totals. 
 37. See Steve Watson, Total Bailout Cost Heads Towards $5 TRILLION, INFOWARS.NET (Oct. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/3
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figure at more than $7 trillion.
38
 Some reporters dramatically estimated the 
―per taxpayer‖ costs. One such report calculated the total bailout cost as 
$61,871 per taxpayer.
39
 And, these early estimates do not include the $787 
billion stimulus legislation later passed by Congress and signed into law 
by President Obama in February 2009.
40
 
A simple tally of dollars authorized or disbursed, of course, is wholly 
inadequate to accurately assess the ultimate taxpayer cost of government 
bailouts. In some cases, the intervention simply authorized the government 
to take specified actions, as needed, at a later date. At least initially, the 
$700 billion bailout fell into this category, as the legislation did not 
provide immediate authority for access to funds. Upon enactment of 
TARP, the Treasury Secretary was authorized to purchase up to $250 
billion of troubled assets.
41
 This authorization was increased to $350 if the 
President certified to Congress the need to purchase additional troubled 
assets,
42
 with the remaining funds to be released upon the President‘s 
submission of a detailed written plan to Congress.
43
 In the end, although 
Presidents Bush and Obama requested authorization for release of the full 
$700 billion, ―improved financial conditions and careful stewardship of 
the program‖ led the Treasury Department to announce in December 2009 
that it did not expect to use more than $550 billion in TARP funds ―unless 
necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial threat to the 
economy stemming from financial instability.‖44  
At the end of the day, the actual long-term cost for TARP and other 
bailout-type disbursements will vary dramatically, depending upon 
particular use of the funds. Different types of government assistance will 
require different cost estimation methodologies. Government purchase of 
troubled assets, for example, may have a very different short- and long-
 
 
15, 2008), http://www.infowars.net/articles/october2008/151008Bailout_figures.htm. 
 38. David Goldman, Bailouts: $7 Trillion and Rising; CNNMONEY.COM (Nov. 28, 2008), http:// 
money.cnn.com/2008/11/26/news/economy/where_bailout_stands/index.htm. 
 39. See Alexis Leondis, Tallying Trillions in Bailout, Bankruptcy: Commentary, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aYwo1tZqGFgA. 
 40. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. 
 41. 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a)(1) (2006).  
 42. 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a)(2) (2006). President Bush subsequently certified the need for release of 
the second ―tranche‖ of funds. Letter from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to U.S. Congress (Jan. 12, 
2009), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/TARP011209.pdf. 
 43. 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a)(3) (2006). President-elect Obama‘s administration subsequently 
submitted the required plan to Congress for release of the third ―tranche.‖ Letter from Lawrence 
Summers, Dir.-designate, Nat‘l Econ. Council, to the leaders of the U.S. House of Representatives & 
U.S. Senate (Jan. 12, 2009) available at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/011209_summers.pdf? 
tag=contentMain;contentBody. 
 44. Press Release, Dep‘t of the U.S. Treasury, supra note 30. 
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term budgetary impact than extensions of direct loans or loan guarantees. 
In fact, government loan guarantees involve no immediate release of 
funds, yet may impose significant long-term costs. Government 
intervention may also take the form of special tax breaks or relief from 
burdensome regulatory obligations.
45
 As difficult as it may be to measure 
the costs of overt bailouts, assessing the costs of these more subtle or 
hidden government actions that may serve a bailout function will present 
even greater challenges.  
II. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT BAILOUTS AND BAILOUT COSTS 
A. Bailout v. Stimulus 
1. Differences in Definition 
Reports of government responses to economic turmoil often loosely 
use the terms ―bailout‖ and ―stimulus,‖ suggesting, perhaps, that the two 
are synonymous. Although the definitional boundary can be fuzzy in some 
cases, government bailout-type actions differ from government stimulus 
efforts along a number of different dimensions. Along the temporal 
dimension, bailouts generally are immediate, emergency efforts to prevent 
imminent collapse, or backward-looking attempts to rescue private entities 
from economic damage that has already occurred. Stimulus, on the other 
hand, tends to be forward looking, designed to spark economic growth or 
redevelopment.  
Such stimulus legislation may come in a number of different flavors. 
Even in times of reasonable economic health, Congress may enact 
stimulus legislation simply to spur general economic growth. For instance, 
Congress adopted the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) of 
depreciation to allow more rapid write-offs of certain business expenses, 
thus stimulating economic investment.
46
 Stimulus legislation also may be 
passed in advance of potential economic decline in an effort to prevent 
future crisis, rather than to provide assistance at a moment of immediate 
crisis. In the alternative, stimulus legislation may be enacted immediately 
after a crisis to spur economic redevelopment of areas hard hit by 
 
 
 45. See discussion infra notes 262–72, 306–23, 328–32 and accompanying text. 
 46. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 
THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 75 (Comm. Print 1981) (―The Congress concluded 
that prior law rules for determining depreciation allowances and the investment tax credit needed to be 
replaced because they did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be essential for 
economic expansion.‖).  
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economic or natural disaster. For example, Congress created special ―New 
York Liberty Zones‖ to spur investment in lower Manhattan following the 
collapse of the World Trade Towers
47
 and special ―Gulf Opportunity 
Zones‖ to spur investment in areas of the Gulf Coast affected by the 
devastating 2005 hurricane season.
48
 These stimulus provisions are distinct 
from other relief efforts designed to offer more immediate assistance to 
disaster victims. 
In scope, bailout tends to be narrower than stimulus. Congress might 
provide general economic stimulus, for example, through broad-based tax 
rate cuts. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine describing any 
government action as a ―general economic bailout.‖ At the other end of a 
continuum, bailout-type government actions may be specific to a 
particular business entity in a way that stimulus is not. It makes sense, for 
instance, to refer to ―bailing out,‖ but not to ―providing a stimulus for,‖ the 
Chrysler corporation. Between the general economy and firm-specific 
extremes, the distinction between bailout and stimulus can be fuzzier. 
Both stimulus and bailout efforts can be focused on particular industries 
such as savings and loan institutions, banks, airlines, or automotive 
manufacturers. One recent stimulus that some might think of as a bailout 
was the so-called ―Cash for Clunkers‖ program, which, for a short time, 
offered government cash rebates to consumers when they traded an old 
vehicle upon purchase of a new, more fuel-efficient one.
49
 A substantial 
factor motivating this legislation surely was the desire to provide 
assistance to small car dealerships, which had been experiencing an 
increasing number of bankruptcies.
50
 Since the legislation incorporated 
 
 
 47. This special zone was defined to include only specified portions of lower Manhattan: ―the 
area located on or south of Canal Street, East Broadway (east of its intersection with Canal Street), or 
Grand Street (east of its intersection with East Broadway) in the Borough of Manhattan in the City of 
New York, New York.‖ Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147 
§ 301(h), 116 Stat. 21, 39 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400L(h) (2006)). 
 48. A ―Gulf Opportunity Zone,‖ or ―GO Zone,‖ includes ―that portion of the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster area determined by the President to warrant individual or individual and public assistance 
from the Federal Government under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act by reason of Hurricane Katrina.‖ Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 
§ 101(a), 119 Stat. 2577, 2578 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1400M(1) (2006)).  
 49. Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, tit. XIII, 123 
Stat. 1859, 1909. 
 50. Although the legislation, on its surface, was a stimulus and environmental measure, several 
legislators and members of the press saw it as just another auto industry bailout. See, e.g., 155 CONG. 
REC. S8955 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby) (―The Cash for Clunkers 
Program is simply another bailout to prop up a struggling industry wrapped in the political guise of an 
environmentally friendly program.‖); 155 CONG. REC. S6790 (daily ed. June 18, 2009) (statement of 
Sen. John McCain regarding ―Cash for Clunkers‖) (―We now own two automotive companies . . . Why 
do we need another bailout for the auto industry?‖); Dan Becker & James Gersenzang, Cash for 
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stimulus features—and as bailout was becoming an increasingly pejorative 
term—it was probably more politically expedient to sell this legislation as 
stimulus. 
Perhaps the most important features often distinguishing bailouts and 
stimulus are policy goals and institutional design. Bailouts tend to offer 
immediate infusions of government funds through direct or guaranteed 
loans, or government purchase of debt or equity instruments. In contrast, 
stimulus legislation is generally designed to provide incentives for 
businesses or individuals to engage in particular desired behaviors. Most 
often, the goal is to stimulate investment, either generally or in specific 
types of assets or investments.
51
 The institutional design most frequently 
adopted in stimulus legislation is a special tax deduction or credit.
52
  
2. Differences in Cost Assessment 
At the margins, one might debate whether a particular piece of 
legislation represents bailout or stimulus. For purposes of this Article, 
however, the key question is whether there is any budgetary difference in 
measuring the costs imposed by bailout as opposed to stimulus legislation. 
Since bailouts generally involve immediate expenditures, it might appear 
that bailout costs are easier to measure than stimulus costs. However, 
simply tallying total disbursements on a cash-flow basis will not provide 
an accurate picture of the long-term costs of bailouts. Some government 
loans will be repaid, but others will not. Although one cannot know in 
advance the precise percentage of businesses that will ultimately default, 
economists have developed sophisticated, risk-based models that permit 
reasonable estimation of long-term credit program costs.
53
 Budget rules 
enacted in 1990 require the use of accrual, rather than cash-method, 
accounting for federal credit programs.
54
 
 
 
Clunkers is Bait and Switch, WASH. POST, May 17, 2009, at A35 (―The automakers are filling up again 
at the Capitol Hill bailout pump. The latest idea is ‗cash for clunkers.‘‖).  
 51. Stimulus provisions may also be designed to encourage employers to hire or retain workers. 
See, e.g., Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 102, 124 Stat. 71, 75 
(2010) (Business Credit for Retention of Certain Newly Hired Individuals in 2010).  
 52. Id.; see also id. § 201 (Increase in Expensing of Certain Depreciable Business Assets). 
 53. Although the federal government generally uses a Treasury market rate to calculate the net 
present value of assets, the EESA actually requires use of a risk-based rate for purposes of computing 
the value of TARP assets held by the government. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261); see discussion infra 
notes 233–44 and accompanying text. 
 54. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13201(a), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-
609 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 661 (2006)). For further discussion of cash versus accrual accounting 
methods, see infra notes 219–32 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] MEASURING THE TRUE COST OF GOVERNMENT BAILOUT 163 
 
 
 
 
By institutional design, stimulus legislation relies heavily on incentives 
to taxpayers, provided through special tax deductions and credits. The 
total actual cost of such legislation to the government, in terms of revenue 
foregone, will depend upon how much taxpayers choose to use the 
incentives. To some, this is the beauty of tax incentives: taxpayers 
effectively ―vote‖ on how much will be spent by either taking advantage 
of the incentive or not. Difficulties in determining in advance the extent to 
which taxpayers will take advantage of particular incentives make long-
term budgeting for such incentives difficult. It might appear that stimulus 
costs for any given year are reasonably simple to measure by summing the 
total deductions or credits actually taken on filed tax returns. Here too, 
however, a simple tally will not provide an accurate assessment. Some 
taxpayers would have engaged in the desired behavior in any event. In 
such cases, taxpayers get a windfall, and the government has made a 
needless expenditure, paying taxpayers to do something they would have 
done anyway. To determine the real stimulus budget cost and the amount 
overpaid, one would need to segregate deductions taken by those who 
were truly motivated by the tax incentive to engage in the desired activity 
from those who would have engaged in the activity in any event. To my 
knowledge, there are no strong empirical research models to measure this 
windfall effect. 
B. Classifying Bailout Types by Cost 
1. Profitable Bailouts 
Government bailouts that provide genuine assistance to troubled 
enterprises do not necessarily involve expenditures of general tax revenue. 
In some instances, the government might even profit. As the direct loan 
transaction was structured in the Chrysler bailout in the late 1980s, for 
example, most or all federal administrative costs were covered by interest 
and fees, and with the loans repaid in full,
55
 the government reaped an 
approximately $300 million profit from the sale of warrants it had taken to 
 
 
 55. 129 CONG. REC. 19,286 (1983) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (―I want to commend the 
Chrysler Corp.‘s decision to repay the remaining $800 million of federally guaranteed debt . . . 7 years 
ahead of schedule. . . . Chrysler‘s success was made possible by passage of the Chrysler Loan 
Guarantee Act of 1979, which allowed the company to borrow up to $1.2 billion backed by federal 
guarantees.‖). 
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secure its risk.
56
 Similar warrants taken as collateral for direct loans to 
Lockheed generated a $31 million profit for the federal government.
57
  
The overall budgetary impact of the 2008–2009 government bailout 
activity is likely to be an increased deficit. As of the end of fiscal year 
2009, however, the Treasury Department Office of Financial Stability 
(OFS) reported $19.5 billion in net income or profit—primarily from 
interest, dividends, fees, and warrant repurchases—from four of its 
―bailout‖ programs.58 OFS also reported both that it had spent less TARP 
money than anticipated and received a return higher than expected from its 
TARP investments.
59
 These two factors, combined with general economic 
improvement, resulted in a smaller projected deficit impact from TARP 
than previously anticipated. In the end, even though some TARP programs 
were profitable, aggregate TARP bailout actions are expected to contribute 
$116.8 billion to the federal deficit.
60
  
2. Low- or No-Cost Bailouts 
Although they may not result in profit, many government bailout-type 
interventions involve little or no expenditure of general revenue. In some 
cases, the government simply may facilitate private-market solutions 
without placing any federal resources at risk. In 1998, for example, the 
Federal Reserve Bank facilitated meetings to bring private lenders and 
investors together to work out a rescue plan for Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM), a major U.S. hedge fund faced with imminent 
 
 
 56. As part of its effort to protect itself from risk, the Treasury Department received warrants to 
purchase Chrysler stock at $13 per share. As Chrysler recovered financially, the stock value increased 
substantially above the warrant price. The government ultimately sold the warrants to the highest 
bidder (Chrysler itself) and made a $311.1 million profit. R. REICH & J. DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE 
CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 254–57 (1985); see also BAIRD WEBEL, N. ERIC 
WEISS & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22956, THE COST OF GOVERNMENT 
FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS, PAST AND PRESENT 5 (2008). 
 57. WEBEL, WEISS & LABONTE, supra note 56, at 6. 
 58. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 13 (2009) (referring to the Capital Purchase, Targeted Investment, and Asset 
Guarantee Programs and the Consumer and Business Lending Initiative). At the same time, however, 
OFS reported net losses of $60.9 billion from assistance to the automotive industry and to insurance 
giant AIG. Id.  
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 40–41 tbl.4-7 (2010) 
(discussing a projected TARP deficit impact of $116.8 billion, $224.1 billion lower than the earlier 
mid-term budget projection). 
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collapse.
61
 In other cases, the government may place itself at some risk 
initially but, ultimately, bear no expense. With federal loan guarantee 
programs, for example, the government simply acts as guarantor in the 
event that the private borrower covered by the program defaults on 
obligations to a nongovernment lender. If administration of the program is 
covered by fees and the government guarantee is never called, the 
intervention falls into the ―no- or low-cost bailout‖ category.62  
3. Nongeneral Revenue or ―Special Fund‖ Bailouts 
Many bailout-type interventions, of course, ultimately do impose real 
costs. Understandably, taxpayers are concerned about the burdens such 
costs impose upon them. Although many bailout-type programs are funded 
through general revenues, bailout intervention need not necessarily impose 
a direct burden upon general taxpayers. An alternative approach is to 
impose bailout costs on some narrower subset of taxpayers.  
Under a benefit theory of taxation, ―an equitable tax system is one 
under which each taxpayer contributes in line with the benefits which he 
or she receives from public services.‖63 In some cases, however, the 
benefit approach seems inappropriate. For example, it would be 
counterproductive to tax the poor on benefits received in the form of 
government-provided food stamps. Thus, modern tax policy generally has 
rejected this benefit theory of taxation in favor of one based more on 
ability to pay.
64
 Nevertheless, ―practical applications of benefit taxation 
may be found in specific instances where particular services are provided 
on a benefit basis. This may be the case where direct financing is made via 
fees, user charges, or tolls.‖65 For instance, fuel taxes paid by drivers are 
 
 
 61. STEPHEN H. AXILROD, INSIDE THE FED: MONETARY POLICY AND ITS MANAGEMENT, 
MARTIN THROUGH GREENSPAN TO BERNANKE 145–50 (2009) (describing Federal Reserve 
involvement in efforts to save LTCM). For a colorful report on LTCM‘s rise and fall, see generally 
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (2001). For further discussion of the Federal Reserve‘s role in the LTCM bailout, see 
id. at 185–218. 
 62. Government assistance that ultimately results in a profit or no cost to the government should 
still be regarded as a bailout because the outcome is a gamble. The government assumes a risk that 
commercial lenders are unwilling to take based upon standard lending principles. General tax revenues 
and substantial taxpayer dollars are at risk in a way that they would not be in a private bailout through 
reorganization in bankruptcy.  
 63. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 219 (5th ed. 1989). 
 64. See, e.g., HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS 
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 3–5 (1938). 
 65. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 63, at 221. 
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used to fund highway maintenance and other transportation-related 
programs.
66
 In this way, the cost of the government service is imposed 
more directly upon those who benefit. 
At first blush, the bailout setting might not appear well suited to the 
benefit approach. To impose costs on those who receive bailout assistance 
simply would dig struggling businesses receiving assistance deeper into a 
financial hole. On the other hand, the federal deposit insurance system is 
structured upon similar benefit-like principles. Among other things, the 
FDIC has authority to take receivership interests in failed banks,
67
 
establish and operate ―bridge banks‖ using the failed banks‘ assets, and 
ultimately transfer ownership of the ―bridge banks‖ to new private 
owners.
68
 Resources to cover bank rescue efforts and depositor insurance 
claims come from funds in bank insurance pools collected ex ante through 
assessments and contributions from banks participating in the insurance 
programs, not from general tax revenues.
69
 Participating banks provide the 
funding for the government insurance program since they make up the 
group or class that stands to benefit from the government program, which 
offers reassurance to bank customers and other mechanisms to provide 
bank stability. For example, the FDIC maintains a Deposit Insurance Fund 
(DIF) available to depositors in the event that one of its insured banks 
fails.
70
 Even when general tax revenues are not used, government-
facilitated rescues should be regarded as bailouts. In each case, the 
government has intervened to provide assistance to a failing private 
enterprise. I refer to interventions in this category as ―special fund 
bailouts.‖  
When insurance pool funds are insufficient, the FDIC has authority to 
impose an additional ―systemic risk special assessment‖ and to call for 
bank prepayments of future assessments.
71
 As a backstop, the FDIC has 
authority to borrow up to $100 billion from the Treasury Department and 
 
 
 66. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (establishing the 
Highway Trust Fund from gasoline excise taxes); see PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30304, THE FEDERAL EXCISE TAX ON GASOLINE AND THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND: A SHORT 
HISTORY (2006). 
 67. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006). 
 68. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(m), (n) (2006). 
 69. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2006) (FDIC‘s risk-based assessment rules). 
 70. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (2006). Although the direct beneficiary of this insurance is the 
individual depositor, insurance programs also serve a bailout function. See Block, Bailouts, supra note 
22, at 973–74. 
 71. One report described a recently FDIC-imposed $45 billion in prepaid annual assessments as a 
―plan financed by the industry to rescue the ailing insurance fund that protects bank depositors,‖ i.e., a 
bailout of the FDIC itself. Stephen Labaton, Banks to Rescue Depleted F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2009, at A1. 
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even more in certain emergency circumstances.
72
 In the end, of course, if 
the FDIC cannot meet its obligations or if additional resources are 
necessary to maintain bank stability, there remains an implicit guarantee 
that Congress will come to the rescue by authorizing the use of general 
revenues. Congress provided such financial supplements, for example, 
when insurance pools proved inadequate in the 1980s savings and loan 
crisis.
73
  
In the case of ex ante insurance funds, such as the DIF maintained by 
the FDIC, those eligible to benefit from future bailout funding must make 
advance contributions to an insurance pool. In contrast, the EESA 
legislation enacted in 2008 uses an ex post collection model. If TARP has 
a net shortfall at the end of five years from the date of enactment, the 
statute requires ―the President . . . [to] submit a legislative proposal that 
recoups from the financial industry an amount equal to the shortfall in 
order to ensure that the Troubled Asset Relief Program does not add to the 
deficit or national debt.‖74 Based on this mandate, at least in theory, the 
Obama administration proposed a controversial ―financial crisis 
responsibility fee‖ on large banks and financial institutions in order to 
recoup bailout costs from TARP.
75
 This proposal called for a fee on large 
financial institutions, even if they already repaid TARP funds received or 
received no TARP funds at all. At the same time, some large nonfinancial 
entities that received TARP funds would not be required to pay. Needless 
to say, financial institutions that generated a profit for the government by 
repaying the TARP assistance they received with interest, fees, and 
warrants, resented the recoupment proposal.
76
 The logic behind the 
collection-model special fund bailout approach was that large financial 
 
 
 72. The FDIC‘s borrowing authority was increased from $30 to $100 billion by the Helping 
Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204(c), 123 Stat. 1632, 1649. The Act 
also provided temporary authority for borrowing of up to $500 billion upon written recommendation 
from the Federal Reserve and Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the president. Id. (to be 
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(3) (2006)). The FDIC insisted that its request for additional borrowing 
authority was simply prudent planning, given that the banking industry‘s assets had tripled since the 
last increase in borrowing authority. Promoting Bank Liquidity and Lending Through Deposit 
Insurance, Hope for Homeowners, and Other Enhancements: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 111th Cong. 8–9 (2009) (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Chief Operating Officer, FDIC). 
Bovenzi added that the FDIC did not expect to use the money. Id. at 10. 
 73. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 Stat. 183. 
 74. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 134, 122 Stat. 3765, 
3798 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5239) (emphasis added). 
 75. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 174 (2010). 
 76. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Wall St. Weighs a Constitutional Challenge to a Proposed Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at B1. 
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entities—even those that did not participate in TARP—benefitted most 
from the governments‘ propping up of failing banks. Assuming that a 
much larger systemic financial breakdown would have occurred absent 
government intervention, the largest financial firms were those with the 
most at stake and, hence, the most to gain from avoidance of a financial 
meltdown. In addition, the largest financial institutions are thought to be 
those best able to pay. 
Congress never enacted the president‘s proposed ―financial crisis 
responsibility fee,‖ but the 2010 Wall Street Reform Act did adopt a 
benefit-like, ex post ―collection model,‖ permitting the FDICif 
necessaryto impose risk-based assessments on bank holding companies 
with $50 billion or more in consolidated assets to contribute to a new 
―orderly liquidation fund.‖77 This technically is not a ―bailout‖ fund since 
it is not available to assist or rescue private firms faced with economic 
distress or imminent failure,
78
 but instead to provide an orderly process for 
shutting down failing financial institutions. At the same time, the idea 
behind the orderly liquidation process is to save the economy from the 
chaos and distress that would otherwise result from the disorderly failure 
of a systemically important financial firm. Ideally, the costs of orderly 
liquidation will be covered by the government‘s careful management of 
the failed financial company‘s assets as receiver. If this should prove 
insufficient, the legislation imposes the burden of paying for orderly 
liquidation on a subset of taxpayerslarge financial institutionsrather 
than the general public. 
4. General Revenue Bailouts 
One major concern raised by the extraordinary government bailout 
interventions throughout the 2008–2009 economic crisis was the message 
effectively sent by the government that it was available as an economic 
safety net for private industry. The perception that government assistance 
will be forthcoming in the event of economic failure encourages private 
businesses to take greater risks than they would in the absence of such a 
safety net. Under the circumstances, perhaps it was prudent for Congress 
and the President to declare forcefully that there will be ―no more 
 
 
 77. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1105, 124 Stat. 1376, 2121–25, supra note 10, § 210(o); see also supra notes 12–16 and 
accompanying text.  
 78. See Block, Bailouts, supra note 22. 
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government-funded bailouts,‖ in order to limit this type of moral hazard.79 
Realistically, however, future bailouts are inevitable in the event that 
economic circumstances become sufficiently dire and the ―tough love‖ 
approach of simply allowing weak firms to collapse becomes politically 
unpalatable.  
Special funds may not always be desirable or available for such 
bailouts, resulting in interventions that require the expenditure of general 
revenue. I use the term ―general revenue bailouts‖ to refer to bailouts for 
which costs are broadly spread among the general taxpaying public. Funds 
for such general revenue bailouts come from general Treasury Department 
accounts. Although minds may differ on accounting and valuation 
methodology and on precisely where the information should appear, these 
general revenue expenditures are typically visible somewhere in the 
federal budget and government financial statements. In other cases, the 
source of funds is the Federal Reserve Bank and not the Treasury 
Department‘s general revenue fund. Even though these costs do not appear 
directly as general revenue expenditures, they indirectly reflect revenue 
costs because they reduce funds that would otherwise be paid to the 
general Treasury through Federal Reserve remittances.
80
 
5. Combination Bailouts 
Bailouts also can be funded through a combination of special funds and 
general revenues. For example, FIRREA established a rather complex 
mechanism to provide funding for the 1980s savings and loan bailout. 
Funds for the bailout theoretically were to come from the sale of assets 
taken from banks in receivership, the sale of nonvoting capital stock to 
Federal Home Loan Banks, assessments against certain savings and loan 
banks, and the issuance of obligations.
81
 In each case, however, it was 
recognized that the ―special fund‖ might not be sufficient to cover all 
bailout costs; Congress authorized supplemental general revenue funding 
from the Treasury Department.
82
 Similarly, although the FDIC generates 
 
 
 79. For further discussion of moral hazard issues, see infra notes 333–36 and accompanying text. 
 80. For a discussion of the Federal Reserve and its surplus remittances to the Treasury, see infra 
notes 130–33, 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 81. For a comprehensive treatment of the savings and loan bailout structure and funding 
mechanisms provided by FIRREA, see JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE 
79–99 (1991); Marirose K. Lescher & Merwin A. Mace III, Financing The Bailout Of The Thrift 
Crisis: Workings Of The Financing Corporation And The Resolution Funding Corporation, 46 BUS. 
LAW. 507 (1991); Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising and Reshaping the 
Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989). 
 82. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
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funds through the collection of fees from covered banks, these fee-
generated ―special funds‖ may be insufficient, requiring the FDIC to turn 
to general revenues.  
Various responses to the 2008–2009 economic crisis also adopted a 
mixed-resource approach. In November 2008, for example, Citicorp 
received an assistance package including Treasury Department funds 
through TARP, along with guarantees from the FDIC and the Federal 
Reserve.
83
 In another program, the Treasury Department protected the 
Federal Reserve by agreeing to cover the first $20 billion in Federal 
Reserve loans through the latter‘s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF).
84
  
III. BAILOUT COSTS: WHERE IN THE BUDGET? 
A. Introduction 
One long-standing debate in budget circles has been the scope of the 
federal budget; in other words, the extent to which government 
expenditures should be ―on-budget‖ or ―off-budget.‖ In 1967, an 
influential report of the President‘s Commission on Budget Concepts 
argued that the budget should be ―unified,‖ meaning that ―the budget 
should, as a general rule, be comprehensive of the full range of Federal 
activities. Borderline agencies and transactions should be included in the 
budget unless there are exceptionally persuasive reasons for exclusion.‖85 
The basic logic of the unified budget is that it ―facilitates use of the budget 
as an instrument of economic policy, and it enables the government to 
 
 
§ 211 103 Stat. 183, 218–22 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(6)(F), (J)(ii) (2006)). Congress provided 
backup Treasury funding to permit payment of interest on obligations for the RTC and FSLIC 
Resolution Fund. See, e.g., id. § 511 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441(b), (f)(2)(E) (2006)).  
 83. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 51 (2009); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury, 
Federal Reserve and the FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ 
press/releases/hp1287.htm (describing package of guarantees, liquidity access, and capital in exchange 
for which Citigroup issued preferred stock to the Treasury, FDIC, and the Federal Reserve). 
 84. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 27–28 (2010). For detailed 
discussion of Federal Reserve bailout actions, see infra notes 105–29 and accompanying text. For 
another example of a joint effort bailout, see the Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIF)/Legacy Loan 
Program described in DARRYL E. GETTER & OSCAR R. GONZALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40413, 
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC): EFFORTS TO SUPPORT FINANCIAL AND 
HOUSING MARKETS 5 (2009). 
 85. PRESIDENT‘S COMM‘N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT‘S COMMISSION 
ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 25 (1967). 
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establish priorities among programs financed by different sources.‖86 Put 
more colloquially, in order to make better allocative policy choices, 
everything should be on the table for discussion.  
Budget figures today are presented in a variety of different, and 
sometimes schizophrenic, accounts.
87
 In addition to ―unified‖ or 
―consolidated‖ accounts, budget figures include ―on-budget‖ and ―off-
budget‖ totals.88 Complicating matters further, many government or 
government-supported activities are conducted through separate entities, 
which include wholly and partially government-owned corporations, as 
well as privately owned, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).
89
 
Although technically private, GSEs are federally chartered corporations 
entitled to certain privileges and subject to limitations not otherwise 
applicable to private corporations.
90
 Perhaps the most well-known GSEs 
are housing and mortgage loan giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
Activities of wholly owned government corporations are technically 
part of the federal budget.
91
 Because they use different accounting and 
financial standards, however, their financial information is presented 
separately and cannot be readily incorporated into regular budget 
schedules. On the other hand, GSEs and partially government-owned 
corporations do not appear at all in any of the various budget accounts, 
unified or not. Depending upon the extent of government involvement, 
however, some of these partially owned government entities and GSEs are 
engaged in activities that arguably should be part of the overall federal 
 
 
 86. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, AND PROCESS 42–43 (3d ed. 
2007). 
 87. For a discussion of the off-budget device and the variety of budget accounts, see Cheryl D. 
Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 
429 (2003) [hereinafter Block, Accounting Scandals]; see also Cheryl D. Block, Budget Gimmicks, in 
FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 39, 46–47 (Elizabeth 
Garrett et al. eds., 2008). 
 88. At least technically, the term ―off-budget‖ refers only to the two social security programs and 
the postal service trust fund that are statutorily excluded from the budget. Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13301, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–623 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (2006)) 
(making social security program ―off-budget‖); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 4001(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2133 (1989) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 2009a (2006)) (making the postal 
service trust fund ―off-budget‖). 
 89. For a discussion of the differences among these various entities, see Block, Accounting 
Scandals, supra note 87, at 432–42. 
 90. See id. at 435–39; see also GSEs: Recent Trends and Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Mkts., Sec. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 
105th Cong. 1 (1997) (statement of James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist). For further discussion of the 
housing GSEs, see infra notes 179–87 and accompanying text. 
 91. Examples include the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 
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budget. To the extent that such entities are not so reflected, I refer to them 
as ―off-off budget.‖ In fact, the move to privatize many government 
functions might skeptically be viewed as a budget gimmick to move 
activities off-off budget and reduce the apparent size of the deficit. This 
phenomenon is not limited to the United States. Governments faced with 
increasing risks and fiscal uncertainties have turned to privatizing many 
state functions, accompanying this privatization with implicit or explicit 
state guarantees. According to one economist, ―[t]hese off-budget 
programs and obligations involve hidden fiscal costs, with implicit and 
contingent liabilities that may result in excessive requirements for public 
financing in the medium and long term.‖92 A true reflection of the budget 
deficit would require some mechanism to incorporate these entities, along 
with the implicit and contingent liabilities they impose.
93
  
Various ―off-off-budget‖ entities have played a significant role in 
recent government bailout activities. The government‘s substantial 
investments in the housing-related GSEs‘ financial instruments, and the 
conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, raise questions about the 
extent to which these otherwise nongovernment entities should be 
incorporated into the budget.
94
 In addition, the Federal Reserve, in 
particular, played an extraordinary and unprecedented role in recent 
government bailout interventions. The sections that follow begin by 
briefly discussing the Federal Reserve‘s general authority and operations, 
followed by an examination of the Federal Reserve Bank‘s recent actions 
and their budget implications. This Part closes with a brief exploration of 
the bailout-related interventions involving housing-related GSEs. 
B. The Federal Reserve 
1. The Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy 
One ―off-off-budget‖ entity that stands in a class by itself is the Federal 
Reserve Bank, a uniquely independent government agency responsible for 
managing monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Bank was initially 
established as the nation‘s central bank by the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913.
95
 Although subject to congressional oversight, the Bank is an 
 
 
 92. Hana Polackova Brixi, Government Contingent Liabilities: A Hidden Risk to Fiscal Stability, 
13 J. OF PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 582, 582 (2001). 
 93. For further discussion of budgeting for implicit guarantees, see infra notes 334–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. See infra notes 183–94. 
 95. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 12 
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independent agency and does not receive appropriations from Congress. 
Three component parts make up the Federal Reserve System: (1) a central 
Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.; (2) twelve regional Federal 
Reserve Banks; and (3) member banks.
96
 The Federal Reserve is charged 
with four major responsibilities: (1) formulating and implementing 
monetary policy; (2) supervising and regulating banks; (3) serving as the 
―lender of last resort‖ for banks and otherwise containing systemic risks in 
the financial system; and (4) serving as a ―fiscal agent for the [federal] 
government and clearinghouse for private sector financial transactions.‖97  
Formation and implementation of monetary policy are probably the 
most important, and certainly the most closely watched, of the Federal 
Reserve‘s regular activities. The primary functions of monetary policy are 
to control the supply and cost of money and credit and to promote stable 
prices and maximum sustainable economic growth.
98
 Three traditional 
monetary policy tools are available to the Federal Reserve. First, the Bank 
uses daily open-market transactions to indirectly manage the supply and 
demand for money and credit. These daily morning transactions involve 
the purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury securities between the New York 
Federal Reserve Bank and eligible ―primary dealers.‖ The quantities and 
terms of these transactions are driven by the ―federal funds rate target,‖99 
set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the policymaking 
arm of the Federal Reserve. The idea effectively is for the Bank to use its 
―monopoly power‖ to move the market interest rate for intrabank loans to 
its desired target. Additional regular monetary policy tools available to the 
Federal Reserve include its authority to establish discount rates at which it 
will extend short-term credit to eligible banks, and its power to alter the 
cash reserve amounts required to be maintained at the Bank by depository 
institutions.
100
  
 
 
U.S.C. § 343 (2006)). Throughout this Article, the Federal Reserve Bank will alternatively be referred 
to as ―the Bank‖ or ―the Federal Reserve.‖  
 96. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES 
AND FUNCTIONS 3 (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS]. Member banks include all 
nationally chartered banks and eligible nonnational banks that elect to join. Id. at 12. 
 97. Id. at 1; see also PAULINE SMALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20826, STRUCTURE AND 
FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1 (2005).  
 98. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30354, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 1 (2009). 
 99. The federal funds rate is the rate at which commercial banks will lend to one another. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2. For a useful and accessible account of the Federal Reserve‘s traditional roles and its 
expanded actions in response to financial crisis, see Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The 
Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 51 (2009). 
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2. The Federal Reserve Bank’s Role in Recent Bailout Activity  
One unusual feature of the 2008–2009 federal government rescue effort 
is the extent to which bailout funding was provided through the Federal 
Reserve Bank, rather than the Treasury Department. As the Federal 
Reserve‘s response to economic crisis has expanded to include new and 
innovative approaches, many of its actions more closely resemble fiscal 
policy than monetary policy.
101
 This transition from monetary to fiscal 
policy occurs when the Bank moves from actions simply intended to 
provide liquidity to actions intended to provide capital assistance to 
struggling firms. The Bank‘s targeted assistance to individual firms or 
industries fits within my working definition of bailout as ―a form of 
government assistance or intervention specifically designed or intended to 
assist enterprises facing financial distress and to prevent enterprise 
failure.‖102 Indeed, several of the Federal Reserve‘s direct loan and loan 
guarantee arrangements with individual private entities appear very similar 
in structure to some of the direct loans and loan guarantees from the 
Treasury Department through TARP. Some are even joint efforts 
involving the Federal Reserve and TARP funds.
103
 To the extent that the 
Federal Reserve makes loans or troubled asset acquisition arrangements 
similar to those otherwise available through the Treasury Department, 
taxpayers may be exposed to risk beyond statutory limits authorized by 
Congress under the EESA and other legislative rescue programs. This, of 
course, raises questions about the extent to which the Federal Reserve 
should be authorized to institute such programs in the first place without 
specific congressional authority. As fascinating as these questions are, 
they are generally beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses 
primarily on federal budget implications of various bailout-like 
interventions.
104
  
 
 
 101. Fiscal policy generally ―is concerned with the determination of tax rates and the level of 
government spending and is the joint responsibility of Congress and the President.‖ GEOFFREY 
WOGLOM, MODERN MACROECONOMICS 5 (1988). In contrast, monetary policy ―is concerned with 
settling the level of money supply and is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve System.‖ Id.; see 
also MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30354, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 1–2 (2009) (―Broadly speaking, monetary policy is any 
policy related to the supply of money. . . . The dominant influence on the U.S. money supply . . . 
comes from the policies of the nation‘s central bank, the Federal Reserve . . . .‖). 
 102. See supra text accompanying note 22 (definition of bailout). 
 103. See discussion infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
 104. The 2010 financial reforms made several changes to the Federal Reserve‘s authority. Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. XI, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1596–1641 (Federal Reserve System Provisions). Some of these are considered at notes 
111, 167, 341–46 and accompanying text. 
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3. Expansion of Federal Reserve Activity in Response to Crisis 
Monetary policy, of course, is the Federal Reserve‘s ongoing, regular 
focus. Times of economic stress, however, call upon the Bank‘s 
responsibility to ―contain financial disruptions and [prevent] their spread 
outside the financial sector.‖105 Even in difficult economic times, the Bank 
typically turns first to its traditional monetary policy toolbox. For 
example, the Federal Reserve can increase liquidity and make credit more 
freely available through reductions in the federal funds rate target or 
discount rate. These traditional tools were used early on and increasingly 
throughout the economic downturn that began in the summer of 2007. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke reported that the Bank ―responded 
forcefully‖ by dramatically reducing the federal funds rate target, noting 
that by ―historical comparison, this policy response stands out as 
exceptionally rapid and proactive.‖106 Beginning in 2008 and continuing 
through much of 2010, the FOMC ―maintained a target range of 0 to 1/4 
percent for the federal funds rate.‖107  
Economic crises severely test the limits of traditional monetary policy. 
Traditional tools have little or no continued impact when the Federal 
Reserve has already reduced interest rates to virtually zero, when the threat 
of systemic economic failure extends beyond financial industries into the 
broader economy and when the cure for a substantial number of distressed 
firms demands more than just short-term liquidity assistance. By all 
accounts, economic events in 2008 and 2009 were extraordinary. 
Chairman Bernanke himself observed that ―[e]xtraordinary times call for 
extraordinary measures. Responding to the very difficult economic and 
financial challenges we face, the Federal Reserve has gone beyond 
traditional monetary policy making to develop new policy tools to address 
the dysfunctions in the nation‘s credit markets.‖108  
From mid-2007 through 2009, this response included an unprecedented 
and dizzying array of new programs or ―facilities,‖ creating a veritable 
 
 
 105. PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 96, at 16.  
 106. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Policies to Ease Credit and Their 
Implications for the Fed‘s Balance Sheet, Speech at the National Press Club Luncheon (Feb. 18, 2009) 
[hereinafter Bernanke, Press Club Speech], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20090218a.htm.  
 107. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS (2009); Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 16, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081216b.htm (FOMC statement 
announcing decisions to reduce the federal funds target rate to 0 to 1/4 percent). 
 108. Bernanke, Press Club Speech, supra note 106. 
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―alphabet soup‖ of new acronyms.109 With such extraordinary new 
activities, Chairman Bernanke was moving the Bank into uncharted 
waters.
110
 As authority for much of this extraordinary action, the Bank 
turned to a provision in the Federal Reserve Act granting expanded 
emergency lending authority in ―unusual and exigent circumstances.‖111 
Until the latter part of 2008, this extraordinary emergency power had not 
been used by the Federal Reserve to extend credit since the Great 
Depression.
112
 Some Federal Reserve actions taken pursuant to its 
emergency authority provided targeted assistance to specific firms or 
facilitated specific acquisition transactions,
113
 while others created lending 
 
 
 109. Some of the new programs introduced or announced in 2007 and 2008 include a Term 
Auction Facility (TAF) (Dec. 2007); Liquidity Swap Lines (Dec. 2007); Terms Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) (Mar. 2008); Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) (Mar. 2008); Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (Sept. 2008); Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) (Oct. 2008); Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) (Oct. 
2008); Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Nov. 2008). See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 47–50 (2009). In light of 
financial improvements, many of the new programs have expired or been closed. BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY PROGRAMS AND THE BALANCE SHEET: THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE‘S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm (describing expiration or closing of MMIFF, AMLF, CPFF, 
and TSLF programs). 
 110. See, e.g., AXILROD, supra note 61, at 155 (―In the end, the innovative measures eventually 
put in place by the Fed were path breaking.‖); ETHAN S. HARRIS, BEN BERNANKE‘S FED: THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE AFTER GREENSPAN 178 (2008) (referring to Bank actions in 2008 as including ―the 
fastest policy change in the modern history of the Fed‖ and ―an unprecedented array of new programs 
to directly add liquidity to credit markets‖). 
 111. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13(3), 38 Stat. 251, 264 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 343 (2006)) (emergency power added to the Federal Reserve Act in 1932) (―In unusual and 
exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System . . . may authorize any 
Federal reserve bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and 
bills of exchange . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat . . . the Federal reserve bank [obtains] evidence that such 
individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking institutions.‖ (emphasis added)) (prior to amendment by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010). The 2010 Act replaced the statutory references in this 
emergency power provision to ―individual, partnership, or corporation‖ with references to ―participant 
in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility.‖ Id. § 1101(a)(2)–(5). This change is an attempt 
to hold the Federal Reserve more closely to its monetary policy functions. The Federal Reserve can no 
longer use its emergency power ―for the purpose of assisting a single and specific company avoid 
bankruptcy.‖ Id. § 1101(a)(6). 
 112. An Examination of the Extraordinary Efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank to Provide 
Liquidity in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th 
Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.). 
 113. For a description of some of these specifically targeted assistance efforts, see BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 50–51 
(2009) (description of Federal Reserve actions to assist Bear Stearns, AIG, Citicorp, and Bank of 
America). Such Federal Reserve assistance to individual firms is no longer permitted. See supra note 
111. 
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facilities and programs that were made more broadly available.
114
 
Most of the Federal Reserve‘s unprecedented new programs or 
facilities in 2008 and 2009 shared several features.
115
 Notable patterns 
reflected in the recent Federal Reserve responses include (1) an expansion 
of the class of institutions to which assistance is offered;
116
 (2) a move 
from extremely short-term (i.e., overnight) loans to longer-term loans;
117
 
(3) a willingness to provide specifically targeted assistance to individual 
firms or specific industries threatened with economic failure;
118
 (4) a 
dramatic expansion of the types of collateral that the Bank is willing to 
accept;
119
 and (5) a willingness to act jointly with the Treasury Department 
and the FDIC.
120
 
In some cases, the expansion of acceptable collateral led the Bank to 
use new and complex funding devices. Rather than hold collateral directly, 
the Bank in some cases established separate entities—referred to as 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)—to hold the assets. This creative device 
 
 
 114. See supra note 109. 
 115. In addition to the Federal Reserve‘s BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2009), useful sources for more detailed information 
on the 2007–2008 new programs include OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 
27–28 (2010); MKTS. GROUP, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
DURING 2008, at 19–25 (2009).  
 116. Although the Federal Reserve typically extends loans only to banks, the TSLF and PDCF, 
both established in March 2008, made loans available to primary dealers. For a brief description of 
these programs, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 95TH ANNUAL REPORT 52–53 
(2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT]. The TALF later made loans even 
more broadly available to holders of certain securities backed by student, auto, and other loans. For a 
brief description, see id. at 55. See also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED 
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, INITIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 81–83 (2009). 
 117. Although the Federal Reserve typically extends only overnight loans, special facilities 
created during the recent economic crisis provided longer terms. For example, TSLF loans were 
available for a 28-day term. FEDERAL RESERVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 52. A more 
dramatic expansion was the TALF program, which made loans available for three, and in some cases 
up to five, years. See Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_faq.html. 
 118. For example, the Federal Reserve, in 2008, provided assistance to Bear Stearns, American 
International Group, Citigroup, and the Bank of America. FEDERAL RESERVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 116, at 56–57. Subsequently enacted provisions now prohibit the Federal Reserve from 
providing such assistance to individual companies. See supra note 111. 
 119. For a discussion of Federal Reserve‘s broadening of acceptable collateral through its 2008 
new facilities, see NEW YORK FEDERAL RESERVE OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS, supra note 115, at 19–
25. 
 120. For example, TALF was a joint project with the Treasury Department in which the former 
agreed to absorb the first $20 billion in losses on TALF loans. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, at 27–28 (2010). Another collaborative government intervention effort was the joint 
Treasury Department, FDIC, and Federal Reserve assistance to Citigroup. Id. at 28. 
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was first used in connection with Bank efforts to facilitate J.P. Morgan‘s 
acquisition of the ailing Bear Stearns.
121
 As the potential bankruptcy of 
Bear Stearns—then the nation‘s fifth-largest banking firm—loomed in 
March 2008, the Federal Reserve determined that ―a disorderly failure of 
Bear Stearns would [threaten] overall financial stability and would most 
likely have significant adverse implications for the U.S. economy.‖122 J.P. 
Morgan was interested in an acquisition, but reluctant to assume Bear 
Stearns‘s risky investment portfolio, made up substantially of mortgage-
backed securities and other housing-related investments. To assist with the 
$30 billion acquisition of Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve created 
Maiden Lane, a new Delaware-based Limited Liability Company (LLC) to 
be wholly owned by the Bank. Immediately after it was formed, the LLC 
received a $29 billion nonrecourse loan from the Federal Reserve and a $1 
billion subordinate loan from J.P. Morgan, which it then used to purchase 
$30 billion in assets from Bear Stearns. These assets were the sole 
collateral backing for the loans, which the LLC was expected to repay 
through subsequent liquidation of the assets. As a result of this transaction 
structure, the first $1 billion in risk of loss was borne by J.P. Morgan and 
the remaining risk borne by the Federal Reserve. Although the Federal 
Reserve does not hold a direct interest in the high-risk assets associated 
with Bear Stearns, it owns them indirectly through its 100% ownership 
interest in Maiden Lane.  
The Federal Reserve‘s decision to intervene in the Bear Stearns case 
was unprecedented in a number of ways. First, the Bank had not 
previously ―committed to ‗bailing out‘ a financial entity that was not a 
commercial bank.‖123 Second, to my knowledge, it had not previously 
agreed to take an interest in troubled assets as collateral for a loan. Third, 
the Bank had not previously used an intermediary entity through which to 
funnel loans. The Bank has since used this intermediary vehicle approach 
more broadly for other new lending programs. In October 2008, for 
example, the Bank created a similar LLC to implement its new 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), which was created to 
improve liquidity and availability of credit for households and 
 
 
 121. For a description of events leading up to the Bear Stearns assistance and the transactions 
themselves, see GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34420, BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND 
―RESCUE‖ FOR A MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS (2008). 
 122. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 50 (2009). 
 123. GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34420, BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND ―RESCUE‖ 
FOR A MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 1 (2008). 
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businesses.
124
 The Bank lent money to the LLC, which, in turn, used the 
funds to acquire three-month (short-term) commercial paper from eligible 
issuers. Later in the same month, the Bank created additional LLCs for 
purposes of implementing a new Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF), which used funds loaned by the Bank to acquire various 
eligible money market instruments.
125
  
One of the most dramatic new Federal Reserve programs was the 
TALF, created by the Bank in November 2008, also pursuant to its 
emergency authority.
126
 Under expanded eligibility rules, this facility was 
made available to ―any U.S. company that owns eligible collateral[,] . . . 
provided the company maintains an account relationship with a TALF 
Agent.‖127 Categories of acceptable collateral were also expanded to 
include securities backed by eligible auto loans, student loans, credit card 
loans, or small business loans guaranteed by the Small Business 
Administration. As originally announced, the program was to make 
available up to $200 billion in one-year nonrecourse loans. Subsequent 
announcements extended the loan term to three years, expanded the types 
of eligible collateral, and indicated that the Federal Reserve was prepared 
to expand the size of the program to as much as $1 trillion.
128
 Another 
unusual feature of the program was the participation of the U.S. Treasury, 
which provided $20 billion in credit protection to the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank using funds authorized under TARP.
129
 Through these 
various new programs, the Federal Reserve clearly moved far beyond its 
traditional role of issuing overnight loans to banks.  
 
 
 124. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2008), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm (announcing creation of CPFF 
facility). 
 125. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081021a.htm (announcing creation of MMIFF 
facility). 
 126. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. 
 127. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Terms and Conditions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y. (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_terms.html. 
 128. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090210b.htm. 
 129. Id.; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY 
PROGRAMS AND THE BALANCE SHEET: OTHER LENDING FACILITIES (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http:// 
www.federal reserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingother.htm.  
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4. Budget Implications of Federal Reserve Programs 
a. The Federal Reserve and Its Balance Sheets 
To understand the budget implications of the Federal Reserve‘s 
extraordinary bailout-like interventions, it will be helpful first to consider 
how the Bank maintains its balance sheets. The Federal Reserve‘s balance 
sheet is usually straightforward and not subject to dramatic changes; until 
recently, changes from month to month or even year to year have not been 
especially remarkable. Total assets on the Federal Reserve balance sheet 
between December 2000 and December 2007, for example, increased at a 
rather steady rate of nine to ten percent each year, ending 2007 at 
approximately $900 billion.
130
 U.S. Treasury securities typically made up 
the bulk of the Federal Reserve‘s assets. From the beginning of 2000 until 
the end of 2007, for instance, the proportion of Federal Reserve assets held 
outright as U.S. Treasury securities remained relatively constant at 
approximately eighty to eighty-five percent.
131
 Most of the Bank‘s income 
derives from interest on securities acquired through the open market, 
―interest on foreign currency investments,‖ ―loans to depository 
institutions‖ and other borrowers, and fees charged for its services to 
depository institutions or for other services.
132
 Historically, the Federal 
Reserve has not only been financially self-sustaining, but has generated 
surplus, which is remitted to the Treasury and reflected in the federal 
budget as revenue. Annual surplus income transferred from the Federal 
Reserve to the Treasury has typically ranged from $20 to $30 billion.
133
  
As some colloquially put it, the Federal Reserve has the unlimited and 
extraordinary power to ―make‖ or ―print‖ money. The Bank effectively 
can increase the money supply simply by expanding its lending activity. 
For example, if the Bank extends an additional loan to one of its 
depository institutions, the increased loan amount is reflected on the 
liability side of the Federal Reserve‘s balance sheet as an increase in the 
 
 
 130. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE‘S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4 fig.1 (2010). 
 131. Data was derived by comparing the last weekly Federal Reserve release for each year from 
2000 through 2007. H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010). 
 132. PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 96, at 11. 
 133. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2010: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 35 (2009) (statement of Robert A. Sunshine, Acting Director, 
Cong. Budget Office); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY 
COSTS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE‘S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 11 (2010) (reporting 
annual remittances between $19 and $34 billion for fiscal years 2000–2008). 
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borrowing institution‘s ―bank account,‖ i.e., liquid funds now available for 
immediate disbursement to the borrowing institution. The same amount is 
included as a loan on the asset side of the balance sheet, i.e., as an amount 
that the Federal Reserve is entitled to be repaid.  
When the Federal Reserve expands its lending activity, it increases the 
cash or money supply. Without any offsetting moves, such Federal 
Reserve action would create the risk of inflation. Given such concerns, the 
Bank does not often expand its lending activities without taking some type 
of ―sterilizing‖ action such as simultaneous sales of U.S. Treasury 
securities. Through such sales, the Bank simultaneously decreases the 
amount of Treasury securities and increases the amount of loans on the 
asset side of the balance sheet. Assuming the amounts are the same, the 
two transactions ―neutralize‖ each other, leaving the aggregate assets and 
liabilitiesor bottom lineof the Bank‘s balance sheet unchanged.  
Such simultaneous ―neutralizing‖ transactions may not change the 
overall size of the Federal Reserve‘s balance sheet, but they do change the 
composition of its asset portfolio. After the transactions, the balance sheet 
will reveal a greater proportion of assets in the form of loans and a lesser 
proportion in U.S. Treasury securities. To the extent that the Bank has a 
smaller proportion of generally secure Treasury securities and a larger 
proportion of loans, its overall portfolio is riskier. A comparison of 
Federal Reserve balance sheet information from 2007 and 2008, for 
example, reveals a dramatic shift in the makeup of Federal Reserve assets. 
At year end 2007, Treasury securities held outright constituted 
approximately eighty-two percent of total assets, while loans constituted 
approximately seven percent of total assets.
134
 These relative proportions 
were consistent with prior years.
135
 By year end 2008, however, Treasury 
securities held outright had declined to only twenty-two percent of total 
assets.
136
 In addition, the categories of assets listed had expanded 
dramatically to include entries for a variety of new lending programs.
137
 
More than fifty percent of total assets at year end 2008 represented some 
 
 
 134. Data was derived from H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE (Dec. 27, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20071227. For 
purposes of these computations, I consolidated repurchase agreements, term auction credit, and other 
loans together as ―loans.‖ 
 135. Data was derived by comparing year-end H.4.1. Federal Reserve Statistical Releases, 
available at H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41. 
 136. H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (Dec. 
29, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/200812278. 
 137. Id. 
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type of loan.
138
 Nonetheless, economic improvements and repayments 
through the end of 2009 improved the composition of the Federal 
Reserve‘s balance sheet; the proportion of assets in less risky Treasury 
securities held outright by that time had returned to approximately eighty-
one percent.
139
  
Early on in the crisis, new Federal Reserve programs were structured to 
―neutralize‖ any increases in Federal Reserve lending with offsetting 
reductions in U.S. Treasury security holdings. In other words, the Federal 
Reserve maintained the overall size of the balance sheet or ―money 
supply.‖ For example, despite the introduction of several new programs in 
the latter half of 2007, total assets on the Federal Reserve‘s balance sheet 
at the end of 2007 were approximately $930 billion, only a 9.8% increase 
from the previous year.
140
 Beginning in the fall of 2008, however, Federal 
Reserve actions began to dramatically expand the overall balance sheet. 
By the end of 2008, total assets had increased to approximately $2.3 
trillion.
141
 To allow further expansion of the balance sheet without 
―printing money,‖ the Federal Reserve also sought assistance from the 
Treasury Department, which agreed to sell additional U.S. Treasury 
securities directly to the public through a temporary Supplemental 
Financing Program.
142
 Funds from the security sales pursuant to this 
program were kept in a separate U.S. Treasury supplemental account 
maintained at the Bank.
143
 Although the composition of the Federal 
Reserve‘s balance sheet returned to its precrisis proportionate amount of 
 
 
 138. Id. For purposes of these computations, I also included amounts from new lending facilities 
and programs. See also Ben S. Bernanke, Chariman, Fed. Reserve, The Federal Reserve Balance 
Sheet, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 2009 Credit Markets Symposium (Apr. 3, 
2009) [hereinafter Bernanke, Richmond Speech], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news 
events/speech/bernanke20090403a.htm (indicating that short-term loans to financial institutions then 
made up 45% of the total balance sheet, and direct lending to borrowers and investors constituted 
12.5%). 
 139. Data was derived from H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE (Dec. 31, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20091231. 
 140. H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (Dec. 
27, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20071227.  
 141. Data was derived by comparing ―total factors supplying reserve funds‖ entry on the Federal 
Reserve‘s weekly balance sheet statements from Dec. 29, 2008, and Dec. 27, 2007. H.4.1: Factors 
Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/releases/h41.  
 142. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Supplementary Financing 
Program (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1144.htm. 
 143. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding Supplementary Financing 
Program (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statement_091708.html. 
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about eighty percent in Treasury securities, the size of the Bank‘s balance 
sheet remains at approximately $2.3 trillion.
144
 
b. The Impact of the Federal Reserve Bank’s Actions on the 
Federal Budget 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke began a 2009 speech to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, recognizing, 
[i]n ordinary financial and economic times, my topic, ―The Federal 
Reserve‘s Balance Sheet,‖ might not be considered a ―grabber.‖ But 
these are far from ordinary times. To address the current crisis, the 
Federal Reserve has taken a number of aggressive and creative 
policy actions, many of which are reflected in the size and 
composition of the Fed‘s balance sheet.145  
Since the Bank is an ―off-off budget‖ agency, its expenses are not 
reflected at all in the federal budget. Taxpayers and legislators 
understandably should be concerned about what Federal Reserve bailout-
type actions are likely to cost the public, in addition to funds already 
explicitly authorized by Congress for TARP and other statutory 
programs.
146
  
In the end, the answer is, perhaps, nothing. The Federal Reserve has 
not experienced an annual net operating loss since 1915,
147
 and despite its 
recent forays into new programmatic territory, has taken various 
precautions such that an annual net operating loss in the near future 
appears unlikely.
148
 Indeed, the worst now appears to be over, and the 
Federal Reserve has terminated many of its emergency facilities created in 
2008.
149
 Since the Federal Reserve Bank is self-supporting and actually 
remits revenues to the general Treasury, one might be tempted to be 
unconcerned about the cost of recent Federal Reserve programs to general 
 
 
 144. H.4.1: Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE (Dec. 
31, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20091231. 
 145. Bernanke, Richmond Speech, supra note 138 (emphasis added). 
 146. See, e.g., Challenges Facing the Economy: The View of the Federal Reserve: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Budget, 111th Cong. 18 (2009) (statement of Rep. Doggett in questioning Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke) (―[R]elying upon the Federal Reserve instead of the Treasury for 
bailouts can also mask the true cost to the public in terms of our soaring national debt.‖). 
 147. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-939, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: THE SURPLUS 
ACCOUNT 11 (2002). 
 148. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE‘S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 11 (2010). 
 149. See supra note 109 (referring to Federal Reserve emergency programs that have expired or 
been closed). 
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taxpayers. After all, taxpayers will not be called upon to foot the bill for 
any Federal Reserve loan defaults or loss in value of other Federal Reserve 
assets unless aggregate Bank losses exceed earnings. Chairman Bernanke 
is careful to stress that most of the Bank‘s new approaches are reasonably 
low risk. For example, he notes that the Bank‘s direct loans tend to be 
overcollateralized and often made with recourse to the borrower‘s other 
assets in the event of nonpayment.
150
 Several programs charge fees, in 
addition to interest, in order to make the program less attractive and, 
hence, ―the last rather than the first resort‖ for borrowing.151  
Despite Chairman Bernanke‘s assurances, there are reasons for 
concern. For a period of time in 2008, the Federal Reserve‘s balance sheet 
was heavily weighted to higher-risk assets, rather than the more secure 
U.S. Treasury issues it usually holds.
152
 Its assets also continue to include 
net portfolios held through the Bank‘s interest in numerous SPVs, 
including three different Maiden Lane LLCs and a CPFF LLC.
153
 
Chairman Bernanke concedes high risk with respect to some assets, but 
argues that the proportion of the Bank‘s assets that are high risk is 
extremely low.
154
  
Even though risks may be reasonably low for the moment, future 
borrower defaults and declines in value of Bank assets held as collateral 
may result in lower Federal Reserve net earnings and, consequently, lower 
remittances to the general Treasury.
155
 The amount lost to general 
revenues from such reduced remittances would represent real taxpayer 
cost. Moreover, if the Bank had incurred substantial losses, taxpayers 
would be on the line to cover them through general revenues. Although the 
extremes are unlikely, Federal Reserve bailout-type actions do have 
 
 
 150. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Crisis and the Policy Response, Speech at the 
Stamp Lecture London School of Economics (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Bernanke, London Speech], 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm. In fact, 
however, many of the loans extended under more recent Federal Reserve programs are nonrecourse. 
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
INITIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 67 (2009) (discussing nonrecourse TALF loans). 
 151. Bernanke, Richmond Speech, supra note 138. 
 152. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE‘S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2–5 (2010). 
 153. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 154. Bernanke, London Speech, supra note 120. 
 155. Perhaps surprisingly, CBO recently estimated that the Federal Reserve‘s expanded activity to 
stabilize the financial system in 2007–2009 may actually result in increased remittances to the U.S. 
Treasury. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT AND SUBSIDY COSTS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE‘S ACTIONS DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4–5, 11 (2010). At the same time, however, the 
report stresses that these projections are now more uncertain because ―the system‘s asset holdings are 
now riskier, exposing the central bank to a considerably greater possibility of losses than its usual 
holdings . . . .‖ Id. at 5. 
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potential costs to the taxpayer that are less visible but, nevertheless, quite 
real.  
To be fair, the Federal Reserve Bank, under the strong leadership of 
Chairman Bernanke, has done its best under difficult conditions to act as a 
good-faith and careful steward of monetary policy and to contain systemic 
financial risk. Still, the Federal Reserve‘s recent bailout-like actions may 
impose costs on the general public even if the Bank continues to generate 
surplus that it remits to the general Treasury. The fact remains that the 
Federal Reserve has unlimited authority to continue lending and to 
continue expanding the money supply. Despite the best of intentions, the 
real cost of the Bank‘s rescue efforts in the long run could be increased 
inflation. With respect to the Bank‘s balance sheet, the FOMC has noted 
that ―it expects the size of the balance sheet to remain at a high level for 
some time as a result of open market operations and other measures to 
support financial markets and to provide additional stimulus to the 
economy.‖156 While aware of traditional inflationary concerns that might 
be raised by an enlarged balance sheet, the FOMC notes that inflation is 
expected to remain low through 2011.
157
 Although inflation ultimately was 
not a problem in the most recent spate of Federal Reserve activity, it 
remains a possibility with respect to future Federal Reserve actions. 
5. Federal Reserve Bank Budget Status and Reporting 
The Federal Reserve is historically and uniquely an ―off-off budget‖ 
independent government agency. Other than a one-line entry under 
―Miscellaneous Receipts‖ for ―Deposits of Earnings by Federal Reserve 
Banks,‖ the federal budget does not include information about Federal 
Reserve Bank revenues and expenditures. Annual federal budget 
appendices typically note that ―[t]he Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System‘s transactions are not included in the Budget because of 
its unique status in the conduct of monetary policy.‖158  
The 1967 President‘s Commission on Budget Concepts, which 
otherwise recommended a completely unified budget, acknowledged the 
unique nature of the Federal Reserve. Citing the ―vital flexibility and 
 
 
 156. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS 2 (2009). 
 157. Id. at 2–3. 
 158. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009 app. at 1273 (2008). For informational purposes, however, 
the budget appendix generally does include a broad summary of the Board of Governor‘s 
administrative budget. Id. app. at 1274. 
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independence‖ of the Federal Reserve‘s monetary policy and the different 
nature of the Bank‘s receipts and expenditures, the Commission 
recommended that ―[t]he payment of excess Federal Reserve profits to the 
Treasury should continue to be treated as a federal budget receipt. But 
other receipts and expenditures of the Federal Reserve banks should 
continue to be excluded from the budget.‖159 
Despite continued recognition of the importance of the Federal 
Reserve‘s independence as the agency responsible for monetary policy, 
concerns have been raised from time to time about the Bank‘s ―off-off 
budget‖ status and the need to make information about its activities more 
freely available. However, the most recent serious questions raised in 
Congress about the Bank‘s budgetary status were in 1985, when 
Representative Lee Hamilton introduced legislation that would have 
required the President to include in every budget ―estimated receipts and 
expenditures of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
and all Federal Reserve banks in the fiscal year for which the budget is 
submitted and the two fiscal years after that year.‖160 In other words, the 
proposed legislation would have included the Federal Reserve in the 
unified budget. At the request of the Congressional Joint Economic 
Committee, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared a report on 
the Federal Reserve‘s budget status.161 Responding to the argument that 
the Federal Reserve‘s annual report should be sufficient public 
information, the CBO Report noted that the annual report receives much 
less public attention than the Budget and does not include information 
comparable to budget information provided for other independent agencies 
included in the federal budget appendix. In addition, the Federal Reserve‘s 
annual report‘s different accounting practices, including use of a calendar 
rather than a fiscal year, make it difficult to comparatively assess the 
Bank‘s annual report information.162 
The then CBO director Rudolph Penner subsequently testified:  
 The current budgetary presentation of the Federal Reserve‘s 
finances is incomplete compared with that of other independent 
government agencies. . . . 
. . . . 
 
 
 159. PRESIDENT‘S COMM‘N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT‘S COMMISSION 
ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 29 (1967). 
 160. H.R. 1659, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985). 
 161. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY STATUS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (1985). 
 162. Id. at 40–44. 
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 On its face, the current budgetary treatment of the Federal 
Reserve violates a basic principle of budgeting: namely that the 
budget document should be comprehensive about government 
operations and should facilitate cost comparisons among agencies 
and activities. More particularly, the reporting of net earnings 
provides little information about financial performance or operating 
characteristics of an agency with the power to create money.
163
 
Even though the CBO Report itself and Dr. Penner‘s testimony offered 
several possible answers to policy and accounting questions that would be 
raised by bringing the Federal Reserve System ―on-budget,‖ Dr. Penner 
did not express a firm opinion with respect to the proposed legislation, 
preferring to leave the matter to congressional judgment.
164
 The then 
Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, on the other hand, took the firm 
position that the ―legitimate objectives of disclosure and public 
accountability can be best achieved by retaining independent budgetary 
reporting for the Federal Reserve (with our net earnings, as at present, 
reflected in the regular budget document.)‖165 In the end, Congress did 
nothing, leaving the then Federal Reserve Bank chairman Volcker with the 
independence he was anxious to preserve. 
Many improvements have occurred since 1985, of course. Congress 
requires the Federal Reserve to release substantial information, including a 
publicly available annual report.
166
 In fact, the Bank has voluntarily 
released more than the required material. The Bank makes its weekly 
balance sheet available to the public online and is working to improve 
website accessibility and transparency of information.
167
 The concern, 
then, is not so much that information is unavailable, but rather that 
because of the Federal Reserve‘s unique ―off-off budget‖ status, the 
potential costs of its bailout-type activities are not reflected anywhere in 
the federal budget and not taken into account more generally as 
 
 
 163. The Budgetary Status of the Federal Reserve Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Econ. Goals and Intergovernmental Policy of the J. Econ. Comm., 99th Cong. 1–3 (1985) (statement 
of Rudolph G. Penner, Director, Cong. Budget Office). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 154 (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Fed. Reserve). 
 166. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ANNUAL REPORT: BUDGET 
REVIEW (2008). 
 167. The 2010 Wall Street Reform Act now subjects the Federal Reserve to additional audit and 
transparency requirements. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1102, 124 Stat. 1376, 2115–17 (special provisions authorizing the 
Comptroller General to audit certain Federal Reserve credit facilities); id. § 1103 (additional public 
access to information); id. § 1109 (one-time audit by the General Accounting Office of loans and other 
financial assistance extended by the Federal Reserve from December 1, 2007, through July 2010).  
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policymakers attempt to allocate the use of budgetary resources. While 
Federal Reserve financial information is available to those who seek it out, 
legislators and the general public simply do not consider this information 
with the same degree of attention they pay to the federal budget. Different 
accounting procedures also make the figures difficult to compare with 
other budgetary information. 
With its new programs over the past several years, the Federal Reserve 
has moved substantially beyond its regular monetary policy role and has 
begun to engage in bailout-type government interventions similar to those 
undertaken by the Treasury Department or other government agencies. 
Budgetary information on bailout costs is incomplete to the extent that it 
does not include Federal Reserve bailout-type activities similar to those of 
the Treasury Department under the EESA. For example, special budget-
related provisions in the EESA require that OMB report semiannually to 
the President and to Congress on the cost of troubled assets and troubled 
asset guarantees and include a description of methods used to derive such 
cost estimates.
168
 These budget provisions further require a CBO 
assessment of these OMB reports.
169
 Beginning with its second report, 
OMB is directed to explain any differences between its own and CBO 
estimates.
170
 In addition, budget rules, as amended by EESA, require the 
President‘s budget to include two different sets of cost estimates for assets 
purchased and sold pursuant to EESA ―troubled asset‖ programs—one 
using a net present value and the other a cash-basis method of 
accounting.
171
 Despite the Federal Reserve‘s acquisition of unusual assets 
through devices quite similar to those used by the Treasury Department, 
these new budgetary rules do not apply to the ―off-off budget‖ Federal 
Reserve.  
The extraordinary and complex array of new Federal Reserve programs 
has begun to blur the traditional boundary between the traditionally 
fiercely independent Federal Reserve Bank and the Treasury Department. 
Indeed, Chairman Bernanke has conceded, in particular, that ―CPFF and 
the TALF are rather unconventional programs for a central bank to 
undertake.‖172 An unusual joint Federal Reserve-Treasury Department 
 
 
 168. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 202(a), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3832–33 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261). 
 169. Id. § 202(b). 
 170. 12 U.S.C. § 5252 (Supp. 2009). 
 171. 31 U.S.C. 1105(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009). See infra notes 222–44 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of the debate over net present value versus cash-method accounting for purposes of 
estimating bailout costs. 
 172. Bernanke, Richmond Speech, supra note 138. 
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press release issued in March 2009 suggests that both agencies are acutely 
aware that recent events have tested traditional boundaries.
173
 The joint 
statement announces several broad principles upon which the two agencies 
agree, including the need for an early government response framework to 
address potential failure of systemically critical financial institutions and 
the need for such framework legislation to ―spell out to the extent possible 
the expected role of the Federal Reserve and other U.S. government 
agencies.‖174 
Although bringing the Federal Reserve fully ―on-budget‖ or subjecting 
its actions to the congressional appropriations process may be too extreme, 
the budget should at least reflect extraordinary Federal Reserve actions 
that involve fiscal, as opposed to traditional, monetary policymaking. 
Moreover, the Bank and the Treasury Department should use consistent 
methodologies to value collateral backing loans and troubled assets held 
outright. Even if no general taxpayer dollars were ultimately ―spent‖ as a 
result of the Federal Reserve‘s bailout-like interventions, amounts 
disbursed by all federal agencies involved in providing bailout-like 
assistance should be aggregated and reported in a consistent fashion so 
that all bailout-type government intervention risks and costs can be 
meaningfully assessed and compared.  
C. Other ―Off-Budget‖ Bailout Issues 
1. Housing-Related GSEs 
One of the most dramatic episodes in the recent bailout crisis was the 
government takeover of the ―off-off budget GSEs,‖ Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.
175
 Both of these independent housing entities were created 
by federal charter to ―provide liquidity and stability in the home mortgage 
market, thereby increasing the flow of funds available to mortgage 
borrowers.‖176 Because of the important public good they were expected to 
provide for home mortgage markets, Fannie Mae‘s and Freddie Mac‘s 
congressional charters gave them various advantages, including exemption 
from certain income taxes, exemption from Securities and Exchange 
 
 
 173. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Role of the Federal Reserve in 
Preserving Financial and Monetary Stability (Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090323b.htm. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See supra notes 24–25, 89–94 and accompanying text; infra notes 175–82 and accompanying 
text. 
 176. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 1 (2001). 
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Commission (SEC) registration, lower costs for credit ratings, and access 
to Treasury Department lines of credit.
177
 Perhaps the most important 
advantage, however, was the implicit government guarantee.
178
 Despite 
explicit disclaimers and disclosures stating that the obligations were not 
backed by the U.S. government, investor perception—in retrospect, 
proven to have been accurate—has always been that the federal 
government would bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the event of 
economic collapse.  
2. Government Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
When the then Treasury secretary Henry Paulson went to Congress in 
July 2008 seeking authority to take control of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, he claimed that he expected not to use the authority, but hoped that 
simply having the authority would restore confidence to the markets.
179
 In 
response to Paulson‘s request, Congress created the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), a new independent GSE regulator with authority 
to take control of the housing-related GSEs, if needed, along with 
authority to purchase GSE debt and securities and other actions necessary 
to restore the GSEs to sound financial condition.
180
  
Not long thereafter, on September 7, 2008, Secretary Paulson stood 
with Jim Lockhart, the director of the new FHFA, to announce that the 
FHFA was taking Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, thus 
transferring complete control of the GSEs from the shareholders to the 
government. Government ownership, in this instance, was intended to be 
temporary, with the conservatorship ending once the corporations returned 
to a stable financial condition. Along with the FHFA conservatorship, the 
Treasury Department announced that it would: (1) purchase up to $100 
billion of senior preferred stock from each of the two entities, with 
warrants to purchase up to 79.9% of GSE common stock; (2) purchase 
 
 
 177. In its careful study, the Congressional Budget Office attempted to quantify direct and indirect 
federal subsidy benefits to the housing GSEs. Id. at 34; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO‘S 
BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 10–13 (2010). 
 178. For a general discussion of the advantages and implicit guarantees related to GSEs, see, for 
example, Block, Accounting Scandals, supra note 87, at 435–39; see also infra notes 333–36 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of budgetary implications of implicit guarantees. 
 179. GSE Initiatives: Hearing Before the S. Banking Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of 
Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary, U.S. Treasury). 
 180. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654; see 
also Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury & FHFA Actions Regarding the Housing GSEs: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of James B. Lockhart 
III, Director, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency); MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22950, 
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN CONSERVATORSHIP 3–4 (2008). 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), 
essentially ―troubled assets,‖ through the open market; and (3) extend 
short-term loans to the GSEs, permitting them to post MBSs as 
collateral.
181
 At about the same time, additional government intervention 
came from the Federal Reserve, which, in November 2008, announced 
programs to purchase up to $100 billion in direct obligations of housing-
related GSEs and up to $500 billion in MBSs backed by Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and others.
182
  
3. Budget Implications of the GSE Takeover and Other Housing-
Related Government Interventions 
Federal conservatorship and other government interventions to assist 
the housing-related GSEs raise several major questions about how 
government interventions on behalf of GSEs should be reflected in the 
federal budget. The first concerns the government purchase of GSE equity 
interests and government lending to the GSEs. Surely, housing-related 
GSE equity acquisitions and lending costs should be reflected in the 
budget in the same way that other similar transactions are handled. A 
second, and more difficult, question relates to the business operations and 
assets and liabilities of the GSEs themselves. Given the magnitude of 
special GSE advantages and implicit government guarantees, ongoing 
subsidies and potential government costs arguably should have been 
incorporated in the federal budget all along.
183
 The case for including these 
entities on the federal budget becomes stronger, of course, when the 
government intervenes to take control. Speaking about this issue before 
the Senate Budget Committee, Acting CBO Director, Robert Sunshine, 
returned to one of the basic principles expressed in the 1967 President‘s 
Commission report: ―[b]orderline agencies and transactions should be 
included in the budget unless there are exceptionally persuasive reasons 
 
 
 181. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 30, 350–52 (2010). 
 182. FEDERAL RESERVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 55–56. The housing-related 
GSEs also received indirect bailout-type assistance through special tax breaks permitting certain 
taxpayers to reflect certain losses on the sales of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock as 
ordinary loss. See infra notes 279–82 and accompanying text.  
 183. JAMES M. BICKLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30346, FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHANGED BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN 
GUARANTEES 14–15 (2003) (―[P]roponents argue that credit reform should cover the subsidy costs to 
taxpayers of GSEs.‖); see also Block, Accounting Scandals, supra note 87, at 438–39; infra notes 333–
36 and accompanying text (discussing budgetary implications of implicit guarantees). 
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for exclusion.‖184 According to the report, criteria for making this 
determination include: (1) the extent to which the government owns an 
entity and selects its managers; (2) whether Congress and the President 
have control over the entity‘s program and budget; and (3) whether 
policies are set to accomplish a broad, public purpose rather than respond 
to the interests of private owners.
185
 Based upon the ―degree of 
management and financial control that the federal government currently 
exercises over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,‖ the CBO concluded that the 
two GSEs should be included in the federal budget.
186
 Although the 
Obama administration OMB announced plans to include GSEs in future 
budgets, it has yet to do so.
187
 
The question of whether and when to include a particular 
nongovernmental business entity‘s finances in the federal budget is not 
limited to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, however. Such questions might 
be raised, for example, with respect to the federal government‘s 
unprecedented 2009 day-to-day involvement with the General Motors and 
Chrysler corporations. As a condition of receiving federal government 
assistance, the two auto companies were required to submit ―viability 
plans,‖ which were evaluated by a presidential Task Force on the Auto 
Industry.
188
 On the one hand, the Task Force was directed ―to avoid 
intervening in day-to-day corporate management and refrain from 
becoming involved in specific business decisions.‖189 At the same time, 
however, the Task Force engaged in significant and detailed reviews of 
business operations, clearly pressuring the companies to make certain 
 
 
 184. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2019: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Budget 26 (Jan. 8, 2009) (statement of Robert A. Sunshine, Acting Director, Cong. 
Budget Office). 
 185. Id. (referring to the PRESIDENT‘S COMM‘N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT‘S COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS (1967)). 
 186. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT‘S BUDGET AND AN 
UPDATE OF CBO‘S BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 9 (Mar. 2009); see also CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, CBO‘S BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 6–7 (2010). 
 187. The Obama OMB cited the complexity of making a change of this type in the short time 
available to complete the budget for fiscal year 2010 as its reason for not making the change 
immediately. H. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT‘S DETAILED 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET REQUEST 30 (2009). Although CBO now treats the housing-related GSEs 
as budgetary, the president‘s 2011 fiscal year budget continues to classify Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac as nonbudgetary, noting that ―further review of which approach better fits both legal 
considerations and goals of budgetary accounting is ongoing.‖ OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, at 140 (2010).  
 188. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN 
THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 10–11 (2009). 
 189. Id. at 34. 
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business decisions in exchange for continued government assistance.
190
 As 
further illustration of the federal government‘s unprecedented 
involvement, President Obama announced that the federal government 
would ―stand behind‖ Chrysler‘s and General Motors‘s warranties as the 
companies went through the restructuring process.
191
 When the automobile 
manufacturers emerged from bankruptcy later in 2009, the federal 
government took an approximately eighty percent equity interest in the 
reorganized Chrysler, and an approximately sixty-one percent interest in 
the new General Motors.
192
 Under the bankruptcy plan, the Treasury 
Department is entitled to appoint directors to both corporations.
193
  
Depending upon the extent of government control and the period of 
time over which it will be exercised, individual firms receiving 
government assistance should be included in the federal budget. With 
respect to the automotive industry, the Treasury Department plans only to 
retain the government‘s equity interests ―for a limited period of time‖ and 
―to dispose of them ‗as soon as practicable.‘‖194 As such, the recent 
automotive industry episode may not be one that calls for inclusion of the 
individual companies‘ financial information in the federal budget. On the 
other hand, a case for budgetary inclusion might arise for future 
interventions in the event that the government takes a longer-term equity 
or conservatorship interest in a private firm. 
Secretary Tim Geithner recently testified on behalf of the Treasury 
Department that our financial system has fundamentally failed and needs 
―comprehensive reform, not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of 
the game.‖195 The Treasury Department‘s subsequent report on financial 
reform noted that during a financial crisis, large, interconnected financial 
 
 
 190. As just one example, the Task Force‘s critical assessment of General Motor‘s viability plan, 
submitted to meet government-assistance conditions, noted that ―while the Chevy Volt holds promise, 
it will likely be too expensive to be commercially successful in the short-term.‖ PRESIDENTIAL TASK 
FORCE ON THE AUTO INDUSTRY, GM FEBRUARY 17 PLAN: VIABILITY DETERMINATION 1 (Mar. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/GM_Viability_Assessment_FINAL. 
pdf. 
 191. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on the American Automotive 
Industry (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-on-the-American-Automotive-Industry-3/30/09. 
 192. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN 
THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 14, 20 (2009) 
(reporting equity stake in Chrysler and General Motors, respectively). 
 193. Id. at 16, 20. 
 194. Id. at 36. 
 195. Addressing the Need for Comprehensive Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dep‘t of the 
Treasury). 
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companies have faced ―only two untenable options: obtain emergency 
funding from the US government . . . , or file for bankruptcy. . . . Neither 
of these options is acceptable for managing the resolution of the firm 
efficiently and effectively in a manner that limits the systemic risk with 
the least cost to the taxpayer.‖196 As an alternative, the Obama 
administration proposed a ―special resolution regime,‖ including 
procedures under which the government could establish a conservatorship 
or receivership for a systemically important failing firm.
197
 Tools available 
to the government under the proposal included ―the ability to stabilize a 
failing institution . . . by providing loans to the firm, purchasing assets 
from the firm, guaranteeing the liabilities of the firm, or making equity 
investments in the firm.‖198 Depending on its duration or extent, 
government seizure of control or operation of a systemically important 
firm surely would raise questions about the budgetary status of the seized 
firm.  
Although modeled after the administration‘s financial reform report, 
the Wall Street Reform Act ultimately enacted by Congress provided more 
limited government authority than the original proposal to deal with 
financial institutions whose failure would present systemic risk. For 
example, the legislation provides that the Corporation [FDIC]
199
 ―shall, as 
receiver . . . , liquidate and wind-up the affairs of a covered financial 
company. . . ,‖200 and ―shall . . . not take an equity interest in or become a 
shareholder of any covered financial company . . . .‖201 The question of 
whether the assets and liabilities of a failing company under government 
receivership belong in the federal budget is less likely to arise to the extent 
that the government‘s authority truly is limited to supervising the orderly 
liquidation of systemically important financial institutions. The issue 
remains important, however, in the context of the housing-related GSE 
conservatorships and any other more substantial bailout-type interventions 
that might occur outside the scope of the Wall Street Reform Act. In 
addition, the budgetary treatment issue might conceivably arise even under 
the Wall Street Reform Act in the event that the FDIC uses its authority as 
 
 
 196. U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 76 (2010). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 77. 
 199. The term ―Corporation‖ is defined by the Act to mean the FDIC. Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 2(7), 124 Stat. 1376, 1387. 
 200. Id. § 210(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. § 206(6). 
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receiver to transfer assets and liabilities of the failed company to a ―bridge 
financial company‖ over which it retains substantial control.202 
A third budgetary concern applicable to the housing-related GSEs, in 
particular, but also to government bailout actions more generally, is the 
fragmented nature of the interventions. If Congress is to make informed 
decisions about future financial assistance or other housing-related GSE 
policies, it should have at least a general sense of the aggregate 
government resources already devoted to these GSEs. There is no one 
place to look for this information. A substantial proportion of the recent 
GSE support came from the Federal Reserve, which is entirely ―off-
budget.‖203 Additional bailout-type programs were funded by the Treasury 
Department, and still others by the Federal Housing Administration.
204
 
This information is not only fragmented, but may also be difficult to 
compare to the extent that different government agencies adopt different 
accounting methodologies.
205
 In addition to making changes to the Federal 
Reserve‘s financial reporting requirements and budget status suggested 
above,
206
 Congress should work more broadly toward an inclusive budget. 
Decisions about whether to include such entities in the budget should not 
be left to the individual discretion of different presidential administrations. 
Congress should establish clear standards for determining when various 
entities should be brought ―on budget.‖ Moreover, Congress should 
develop consistent accounting mechanisms to enable more useful 
comparisons of various related bailout-type government activities.  
 
 
 202. The FDIC‘s authority as receiver to ―liquidate and wind-up‖ includes the power to transfer 
assets of a covered financial company to a bridge financial company. Id. § 210(a)(1)(D). Statutory 
provisions regarding the charter and establishment of bridge financial companies give the FDIC 
signicant control over bridge companies, including appointing of directors, id. § 210(h)(2)(B), 
specifying terms of the company‘s articles of association, id. § 210(h)(2)(C), authorizing and 
providing terms and conditions for the issue of stock or securities, id. § 210(h)(2)(G)(iii), or making 
funds available for the bridge company‘s operations, id. § 210(h)(2)(G)(iv).  
 203. See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text. 
 204. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 346–48 (2010). 
 205. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND 
CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 11 (2009) (noting the three different 
types of budget treatment for the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC). 
 206. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
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IV. ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF OVERT BAILOUTS  
A. Introduction: Budget Accounting for Contingent Risks and Uncertain 
Valuations 
Whether ―on-budget‖ or ―off-budget,‖ a substantial portion of the 
government response to economic crisis has been pursuant to statutes or 
regulations that overtly authorize particular types of federal bailout 
expenditures. Overt authorization occurs where there is a formal 
government program explicitly designed to provide assistance to failing 
businesses or to prevent economic failure or collapse. In this sense, an 
overt program still might be ―off-budget,‖ or details of its operation or 
finances otherwise might not be fully transparent. A government program 
is overt simply if it serves an express bailout-type function. Some overt 
programs are more transparent than others. Media headlines and public 
conversation about massive bailouts tend to focus on dollar amounts 
authorized by recent legislation, such as the $700 billion in TARP funds 
authorized by EESA.
207
 Countless other federal programs, including the 
various Federal Reserve initiatives discussed earlier, also provided bailout-
type relief.
208
 As one commentator noted, ―TARP is massive, but it gets 
disproportionate attention relative to the size of other government 
programs that did not require legislation. It is just one part of a 
governmentwide [sic] effort to support and stabilize the financial 
system.‖209 
Assessing the true costs of even the most overt government bailout 
interventions is far more complex than a simple tally of total 
disbursements from the federal fisc. Borrowers may not repay amounts 
received as direct government loans, and the government may not 
ultimately be obliged to make payments pursuant to loan guarantee 
programs. Also, the government might lose with respect to its equity or 
troubled asset investments in connection with particular failing companies. 
Risk levels vary dramatically for different types of loan and investment 
programs and vary from borrower to borrower or investment to 
investment. The sections that follow explore the budget accounting 
challenges presented by various types of government economic 
intervention. 
 
 
 207. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 105–29 and accompanying text. 
 209. Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing Financial Pollution, 2010 TAX NOTES 697, 
699 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
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B. Direct Loans, Loan Guarantees, and Other Contingent Liabilities 
1. Federal Government Loan and Insurance Programs 
The federal government routinely operates numerous direct federal 
loan and loan guarantee programs, included among them several designed 
to assist students,
210
 small businesses,
211
 rural utility services,
212
 and home 
buyers.
213
 In addition, the federal government provides federal bank 
deposit insurance, along with a number of other federal insurance 
programs.
214
 One common government response to economic crisis is to 
increase authority for already existing direct loan, loan guarantee, or 
insurance programs, or to create new ones. Such actions made up the bulk 
of the government‘s response to the 2008–2009 economic crisis. One 
feature of the recent EESA bailout legislation, for example, was an 
increase in the insurance coverage cap from $100,000 to $250,000 for 
accounts maintained at FDIC-insured depository institutions.
215
 More 
 
 
 210. The federal government began its direct student loan programs with the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 201, 72 Stat. 1580, 1583. For the current direct loan 
programs, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1087a–1087j (2006) (William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program); 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1087aa–1087vv (2006) (need-based federal Perkins loans). Federal student loan guarantees 
and federal student loan insurance programs began with the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-329, § 421, 79 Stat. 1219, 1236. For the current student loan guarantee and insurance 
programs, see 20 U.S.C. § 1071 (2006) (Robert T. Stafford Federal Student Loan Program). 
 211. The Small Business Administration (SBA), created by the Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 
85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958), has authority to extend direct loans and loan guarantees to qualified small 
businesses. Id. § 7. For current SBA loan authority, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 636 (2006) (―loans 
to small business concerns‖). 
 212. The Department of Agriculture was empowered, for example, to extend loans to develop 
electrical and telephone infrastructure in rural areas. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-
605, 49 Stat. 1363 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 902–950aaa (2006)). 
 213. Eligible home buyers may receive federally guaranteed mortgages through the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA). See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1707–1715 (2006); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 346 (2010). In addition to the FHA, Congress created GSEs Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to provide guarantees on mortgage-backed securities. See supra notes 175–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 214. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), established by the Banking Act of 1933, 
Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, provides insurance for accounts maintained at insured depository 
institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2006). See also Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-
430, tit. V, 52 Stat. 1938 (1956) (Federal Crop Insurance Act) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 
(2006)); Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1016, 70 Stat. 1078 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2006)). 
 215. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122 Stat. 3765, 
3799 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261). Although the increase was originally scheduled to 
expire at the end of 2009, the $250,000 coverage amount was extended through the end of 2013, 
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1632, 
1648–49, and later made permanent by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
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significantly, much of the recent bailout response involved new loan, loan 
guarantee, and other similar programs. Several of these recent programs 
technically took the form of government purchases of preferred stock or 
other equity interests in exchange for capital infusions from the 
government.
216
 For purposes of assessing bailout cost, however, these 
federal purchases can be viewed as loan-type transactions. In most cases, 
the government did not mean to take a long-term shareholder interest, but 
intended to sell its equity stake back to the firms receiving the capital as 
soon as it was financially prudent for the firms to redeem or repurchase the 
stock or warrants. The firms‘ redemption or repurchase of government-
held equity is essentially equivalent to repayment of a government loan.
217
 
In several cases, the government profited when participating corporations 
repurchased their own equity at a higher price than the capital initially 
contributed by the government. As noted by the OFS, ―disposition of 
warrants has succeeded in significantly increasing taxpayer returns on the 
CPP preferred investments that have been repaid. As of December 31, 
2009, Treasury has received $4 billion in gross proceeds on the disposition 
of warrants in 34 banks . . . .‖218 
2. Cash v. Accrual Accounting for Loans and Other Credit Programs 
Before the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990,
219
 the federal 
budget generally recorded expenditures for federal credit programs using a 
cash method of accounting. Under this method, expenditures are recorded 
for the budget year in which funds are paid out, and income is recorded for 
the budget year in which funds are received.
220
 Thus, a direct government 
loan was reflected as cost when funds were disbursed, even if it was likely 
 
 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (to be codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(a)(1)(E)). 
 216. For example, the TARP Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and Targeted Investment Program 
(TIP) were equity investment programs. 
 217. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: TARP REPAYMENTS, INCLUDING 
THE REPURCHASE OF STOCK WARRANTS 10 (2009) (―In the same way that loans are repaid, preferred 
shares are ‗redeemed‘ by the institution paying back the ‗liquidation‘ amount of the shares, equivalent 
to the principal amount of a loan.‖). 
 218. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, WARRANT DISPOSITION REPORT 1 
(2009). 
 219. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified at 2 
U.S.C. § 661 (2006)). 
 220. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-734SP, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN 
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 27–28 (2005) (defining cash method as a ―system of accounting in 
which revenues are recorded when cash is actually received and expenses are recorded when payment 
is made without regard to the accounting period in which the revenues were earned or costs were 
incurred‖). 
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to be repaid. On the other hand, even if the borrower was likely to default, 
a government loan guarantee did not appear as budget cost until the 
borrower defaulted and the government was actually required to make 
good on the guarantee. As a result, direct government loan budget costs 
were overstated, and loan guarantee costs were understated. Moreover, the 
apparently lower price tag for loan guarantees created a policy bias in 
favor of guarantee over direct loan programs, without genuine policy 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the different 
approaches. 
Concern over these budgetary distortions led Congress to adopt FCRA, 
which requires accrual accounting for most direct loan and loan guarantee 
programs.
221
 Under this method, the value of a loan or loan guarantee is 
determined first by estimating all expected cash inflows and outflows for 
the duration of the transaction. Those projections are then consolidated 
and expressed as a single figure, using present-value calculations. 
Computing present value requires use of an interestor discountrate to 
determine the value today of an expected future payment or the amount 
that must be set aside today in order to meet a future obligation.
222
  
Most would probably agree that accrual-basis reforms mandated by 
FCRA have improved the accuracy of federal budget reporting for loans 
and loan guarantees.
223
 Still, some accuracy and consistency issues remain. 
First, FCRA was not comprehensive in its scope. Although most credit 
programs now are governed by accrual accounting rules, the statute 
explicitly exempts entitlement programs and credit programs of the 
Commodity Credit Corporation.
224
 In addition, FCRA does not apply to 
credit or insurance activities of the FDIC and certain other deposit 
insurance programs.
225
 In the end, different budget accounting rules may 
 
 
 221. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2006) (defining ―cost‖ to mean ―the estimated long-term cost to the 
Government of a direct loan or loan guarantee or modification thereof, calculated on a net present 
value basis, excluding administrative costs . . . .‖) (emphasis added). The President is directed to 
include such costs of direct loans and guarantees, along with planned levels of new loan obligations or 
guarantees, in the President‘s annual budget. Id. § 661c(a). 
 222. For a simple description and example, see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE VALUE 
OF SUBSIDIES FOR FEDERAL LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES 2 n.4 (2004). 
 223. See, e.g., id. at 2 (―[C]redit-reform accounting provides more useful cost estimates than did 
the cash-basis accounting it replaced. The current approach is forward looking for the life of the loan; 
it accounts for the time value of money; and it generally assigns the same budgetary cost to equivalent 
loans and loan guarantees.‖). 
 224. 2 U.S.C. § 661c(c) (2006). 
 225. 2 U.S.C. § 661e(a) (2006) (exempting the FDIC, along with the ―National Credit Union 
Administration, Resolution Trust Corporation, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, National Flood 
Insurance, National Insurance Development Fund, Crop Insurance, [and] Tennessee Valley 
Authority‖). The CBO was directed to study and report back to Congress on whether federal deposit 
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apply depending on the particular agency source of the federal lending or 
guarantee activity. Federal Reserve loan-related activities are generally 
entirely ―off-budget.‖226 Moreover, even though all Treasury Department 
programs are governed by FCRA‘s accrual reporting requirements, TARP 
expenditures that are used for some Treasury Department bailout-type 
interventions are subject to special risk-based accounting rules that do not 
apply to other Treasury Department expenditures.
227
 On the other hand, 
FDIC bailout-type actions are reported for budget purposes through cash-
method accounting.
228
  
At a minimum, these different approaches create consistency problems, 
making it difficult to compare the budget consequences of lending 
activities undertaken by different government agencies. In turn, these 
difficulties complicate policy choices regarding the most efficient use and 
source of government loans and guarantees. 
A second remaining potential accuracy and consistency problem under 
FCRA relates to setting an appropriate interest or discount rate to compute 
net present value. Although the concept of discounting to net present value 
is straightforward, choosing the appropriate rate requires insight into 
future general economic conditions and market risk. FCRA explicitly 
resolves the issue by requiring use of ―the average interest rate on 
marketable Treasury securities of similar maturity to the cash flows of the 
direct loan or loan guarantee for which the estimate is being made.‖229 
These FCRA present-value calculations, based upon risk-free Treasury 
security rates, differ from those used by private lenders in that the 
government estimates ―exclude the cost of market risk—the compensation 
that investors require for the uncertainty of expected but risky cash 
flows.‖230 
Critics charge that the effect of using Treasury rates, rather than market 
risk-based rates, to calculate net present value ―is to overstate the value of 
 
 
insurance programs should use similar accrual accounting methods for budget purposes. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 661e(b). In its report, CBO was critical of existing federal budget accounting for deposit insurance 
programs, but noted both advantages and disadvantages to switching to accrual budget accounting. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
REFORM, at x–xiii (1991). 
 226. See supra notes 158–74 and accompanying text. 
 227. See infra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
 228. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND 
CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 11 (2009) (noting the three different 
types of budget treatment for the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC). 
 229. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) (2006). 
 230. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIES FOR FEDERAL LOANS AND 
LOAN GUARANTEES 1–2 (2004). 
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federal direct loans and understate the value of government guarantees, 
relative to the price that would be observed in competitive financial 
markets.‖231 A CBO study of the issue reached a similar conclusion: 
[I]gnoring the cost of risk understates the federal cost of credit 
assistance, potentially biasing the allocation of budgetary resources. 
For example, excluding the cost of risk from budget and program 
decisions may mislead policymakers by suggesting that some 
federal credit programs provide financial resources to the 
government at no cost to taxpayers. It also encourages reliance on 
credit rather than other policies that might be more efficient in 
achieving particular goals.
232
 
3. TARP, Credit Reform, and Asset Valuation 
Substantive legislation often fails to include details on how to reflect 
programmatic expenses and revenues in the budget. Congress was explicit 
in EESA, however, when it required that ―the costs of purchases of 
troubled assets . . . and guarantees of troubled assets . . . , and any cash 
flows associated with [various authorized TARP activities] shall be 
determined as provided under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990.‖233 
In other words, budget accounting for TARP programs must be done on an 
accrual rather than a cash-flow basis. More specifically, Congress 
responded to FCRA critics by explicitly requiring that discount rate 
calculations used to determine net present value for EESA purposes be 
adjusted for market risk.
234
 In other words, Congress instructed the 
Treasury Department not to use Treasury rates, but instead to use a ―new 
and improved‖ FCRA accounting method with respect to TARP 
activities.
235
 Assuming that the risk-based discount rates utilized are 
 
 
 231. Deborah Lucas & Marvin Phaup, Reforming Credit Reform, 28 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 90, 
91 (2008). 
 232. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF SUBSIDIES FOR FEDERAL LOANS AND 
LOAN GUARANTEES 2–3 (2004). 
 233. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 123(a), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3790 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261).  
 234. Id. § 123(b)(1) (―[T]he cost of troubled assets and guarantees of troubled assets shall be 
calculated by adjusting the discount rate in . . . 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(E) for market risks.‖). 
 235. The Bush administration initially took the position that EESA‘s statutory reference to the 
Credit Reform Act applied only to direct loans and loan guarantees and thus budgeted for other types 
of TARP disbursements using the cash method. The CBO, in contrast, computed net present value 
costs for all TARP activities. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: 
REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2008, at 4 (2009) (contrasting OMB and CBO 
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reasonably accurate, the new and improved TARP accrual reporting 
should provide a more accurate picture of long-term budgetary costs. 
Despite EESA‘s statutory emphasis on acquiring troubled assets, the 
Treasury Department quickly ―abandoned its original strategy of 
purchasing ‗troubled‘ mortgage and other assets from the nation‘s 
financial institutions, deciding instead to invest money directly into those 
institutions.‖236 In most cases, the government transferred cash to 
struggling financial institutions in exchange for equity interestsin the 
form of preferred stock and warrantsthat were specifically tailored for 
the TARP program and for which there was no public market. Thus, 
TARP‘s net-present-value approach to valuing assets is relevant not just 
for budget purposes. Before considering budget reporting issues, the 
Treasury Department needed to use net-present-value judgments to 
determine the appropriate price to pay for various equity interests.  
One of the largest TARP programs was the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP), through which the Treasury Department purchased senior preferred 
equity and subordinated debentures.
237
 According to the Treasury 
Department, this program was designed to ―directly infuse capital into 
healthy, viable banks with the goal of increasing the flow of financing 
available to small businesses and consumers.‖238 In addition to programs 
designed to ensure the stability of otherwise healthy financial institutions 
in a down economy, the Treasury Department created similar programs to 
invest in struggling businesses. Through the Systemically Significant 
Failing Institutions program, for example, the government purchased ten 
percent of senior preferred AIG stock in order to provide needed capital to 
the ailing insurance giant.
239
  
 
 
accounting). The Obama administration has since adopted CBO‘s net-present-value accounting for all 
TARP activities. 
 236. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY‘S 
ACQUISITIONS 4 (2009). 
 237. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 14–15 (2009). 
 238. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Treasury Provides Funding to Bolster Healthy, 
Local Banks: Capital Purchase Program Funds 23 Banks to Help Meet Lending Needs of Local 
Consumers, Businesses (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg03.htm. 
At about the same time, the Treasury Department also created the Targeted Investor Program (TIP), 
designed to provide funding to large financial institutions thought to be systemically important to 
financial system functioning. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Guidelines 
for Targeted Investment Program (Jan. 2, 2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ 
hp1338.htm. This program apparently was focused on Citigroup. See id. 
 239. U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, TARP AIG SSFI INVESTMENT SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK 
AND WARRANT: SUMMARY OF SENIOR PREFERRED TERMS (2008), available at http://www.ustreas. 
gov/press/releases/reports/111008aigtermsheet.pdf (last visited May 15, 2010). See also supra note 32 
and accompanying text. 
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As mandated by EESA, the Treasury Department is required to use 
risk-based net-present-value accounting for valuing these purchases. But 
conceptualizing risk-based net-present-value discounting is far easier than 
implementing it. Ideally, each investment should be carefully analyzed on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into account specific details about default and 
other risks with respect the particular investment. The congressional 
oversight panel established to conduct monthly reviews of Treasury 
Department activity under the TARP program recently reported that the 
―Treasury paid substantially more for the assets it purchased under the 
TARP than their then-current market value.‖ Instead of a case-by-case 
analysis, the Treasury Department adopted a ―one-size-fits-all investment 
policy,‖240 making equity investments on similar terms in both so-called 
―healthy‖ and ―weaker institutions.‖241 One particular concern with a 
―one-size-fits-all‖ approach is that it creates differential subsidy rates. In 
one report, for example, CBO estimated a seventy-three percent subsidy 
for auto-related government assistance, but only a two percent subsidy for 
bailout transactions with certain financial institutions.
242
 In addition, by 
some estimates, the cost of assistance to AIG per dollar committed was 
double the cost of similar support to Citigroup.
243
 The Treasury 
Department might defend itself, in part, by arguing that the government 
ultimately profited from many of its TARP investments. Under these 
circumstances, however, one might question how much more profit the 
government would have earned if it had not overpaid for many of these 
investments. This question is all the more apt when the country is facing 
such extraordinary federal deficits. Differential subsidy rates are not 
necessarily wrong as a policy matter. The problem with the current 
approach is that subsidy differences do not appear to be the result of 
measured policy judgments, but instead an almost accidental outcome of 
different accounting methodologies used for different government 
programs and a one-size-fits-all approach to valuation for very different 
transactions within the same programs. 
Congress must refine its budget accounting by using market-risk 
analysis to more systematically compute net present value. To do this, 
Congress could establish an independent valuation entity with expertise in 
 
 
 240. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY‘S 
ACQUISITIONS 2 (2009). 
 241. Id. at 8. 
 242. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: REPORT ON 
TRANSACTIONS THROUGH JUNE 17, 2009, at 3–4 (2009). 
 243. ELLIOTT, supra note 21, at 4 (referring to CBO report). 
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market-based risk assessment. To make informed decisions about the most 
efficient allocation of bailout resources, Congress must be able to compare 
the extent to which different government interventions involve different 
―subsidy rates.‖ 
Another significant problem may simply be that some valuations are 
just fuzzier or more uncertain than others. Congress must give up the 
―illusion of precision‖244 and instead work within confidence ranges, or at 
least indicate some measure of the degree of certainty behind particular 
valuations. Alternatively, budget accounts might isolate the more 
uncertain figures into a separate set of accounts. 
4. Mission Fragmentation 
Many of the government‘s 2008–2009 interventions were 
―combination bailouts,‖245 or joint efforts involving the cooperation of 
multiple agencies in the same program.
246
 When so many different 
agencies are simultaneously engaged in similar types of bailout-like 
interventions, fragmentation can make it difficult to absorb even 
information that is reflected in the budget. For one thing, the information 
for each agency appears in separate agency accounts and may be difficult 
to consolidate.
247
 Second, agencies use different methods of accounting, 
making it difficult to compare and assess the efficiency of one program 
over another.
248
 Non-TARP credit programs governed by FCRA use 
accrual-method accounting, but are not required to use market-risk-based 
discount rates. On the other hand, TARP-based Treasury Department 
programs are directed to use the new and improved market-risk-based 
discount rates.
249
 This can lead to odd results given that a significant 
portion of the Treasury Department‘s bailout intervention was not under 
the TARP umbrella. Similar bailout-type programs, even within the same 
agency, may reflect different methods of accounting. For example, when 
 
 
 244. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613 (1995). 
 245. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 83–84, 128–29 and accompanying text. 
 247. Mission fragmentation is certainly not limited to bailout programs. Then comptroller general 
David Walker testified about ―widespread mission fragmentation and program overlap throughout 
major mission areas at the federal level. . . . Even more broadly, many missions are characterized by 
the presence of multiple tools, such as tax expenditures, grants, loans, and direct federal spending 
programs.‖ The Office of Management and Budget: Is OMB Fulfilling Its Mission?: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info. and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 75 
(2000) (prepared statement of David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen.).  
 248. See supra notes 223–28 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 233–43 and accompanying text. 
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asked to report on a proposed $34 billion bridge loan to the auto industry, 
CBO estimated only a fifty percent subsidy rate for a non-TARP program, 
but a seventy percent subsidy rate for the same loan under TARP because 
the latter ―program‘s accounting requires an adjustment to reflect market 
risk.‖250  
The extent to which government bailout interventions can be 
fragmented is further illustrated by actions taken by the FDIC during the 
2008–2009 economic crisis. Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
FDIC is a government-owned independent agency, established by the 
Banking Act of 1933 to insure bank deposits.
251
 Hence, the FDIC is an 
―on-budget‖ agency. Like the Federal Reserve,252 the FDIC has 
authority—albeit infrequently used—to take certain emergency actions to 
avoid or mitigate systemic risk.
253
 Just weeks after Congress passed its 
substantial EESA bailout package, the FDIC announced its own 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, under which it would guarantee 
senior unsecured debt instruments.
254
 According to presidential budget 
documents, this was the first time that the FDIC guaranteed bank and bank 
holding company debt.
255
 Since the authority for these FDIC actions did 
not come from the TARP legislation, the FDIC is not statutorily bound to 
use risk-based accrual accounting. In fact, the FDIC is not governed at all 
by the accrual-reporting FRCA requirements.
256
 As reported by the TARP 
Oversight Committee, ―[o]nly the cash flows associated with the FDIC 
guarantees are reflected in the federal budget, not the discounted present 
value of those flows. This means that no ‗cost‘ is recorded for the FDIC 
 
 
 250. Letter from Robert A. Sunshine, Acting Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to John M. Spratt, Chair, 
Comm. on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 5, 2008). 
 251. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006)). 
 252. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
 253. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2006). 
 254. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. § 370 (2008); see also DARRYL E. 
GETTER & OSCAR R. GONZALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40413, THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC): EFFORTS TO SUPPORT FINANCIAL AND HOUSING MARKETS 4–5 
(2009); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 25–26 (2009). 
 255. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 28 (2010). The FDIC also 
participated with the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve in providing assistance to Citigroup 
and Bank of America. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT: 
GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 16–20 (2009); see 
also DARRYL E. GETTER & OSCAR R. GONZALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40413, THE FEDERAL 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC): EFFORTS TO SUPPORT FINANCIAL AND HOUSING 
MARKETS 6 (2009) (describing joint Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIF) with the U.S. Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve). 
 256. 2 U.S.C. § 661(e)(a) (2006); see also supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
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guarantees . . . unless there is an actual default and payment of a guarantee 
. . . .‖257  
In sum, Federal Reserve actions do not appear at all in the budget, 
TARP transactions may use different types of accrual-accounting 
methodologies, and the FDIC uses cash-method budget accounting.
258
 
These inconsistencies are especially troubling when different agencies are 
cooperating in joint administration of the same bailout program.  
Congress should consolidate the authority and budget reporting 
requirements for bailout-like interventions and, to the extent possible, 
make all such intervention ―on-budget.‖ Adding to the fragmentation 
problem, many bailout-type programs are delivered through the tax system 
in the form of special exclusions, deductions, or credits.
259
 The costs 
incurred as a result of revenue lost from these provisions are not included 
in the regular budget.
260
 As one Government Accounting Office report 
observed, ―mission fragmentation and program overlap can create an 
environment in which programs do not serve participants as efficiently and 
effectively as possible. Like spending programs, tax expenditures may 
reduce government effectiveness to the extent that they duplicate or 
interfere with other federal programs.‖261 The sections that follow consider 
the potentially hidden costs of various tax-related and other more ―covert‖ 
bailout-type government activities. 
V. ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF COVERT OR HIDDEN BAILOUTS 
A. Relief Through Tax Expenditures 
1. In General 
In times of economic stress, government assistance can be provided 
through indirect payments in the form of temporary tax exclusions, 
deferrals, deductions, or credits, sometimes referred to as ―tax 
 
 
 257. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND 
CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 11 (2009). 
 258. As the TARP oversight panel observes, ―[f]rom a consolidated, government-wide 
perspective, the federal budget treats the guarantee transactions of the three agencies in three different 
ways.‖ CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NOVEMBER 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND 
CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP AND RELATED PROGRAMS 11 (2009). 
 259. See infra notes 266–82 and accompanying text. 
 260. See infra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. 
 261. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND 
NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 51 (2005). 
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expenditures.‖ 262 In addition to direct spending legislation, Congress often 
turns to this tax-expenditure toolbox to provide bailout-type relief. Any 
reduction in tax liability to the struggling business is revenue foregone to 
the federal fisc and thus a cost imposed upon general taxpayers. It is well 
accepted that special tax deductions, credits, exclusions, and deferrals that 
reduce government receipts generate real budget costs that can be 
measured in estimated foregone revenue.
263
 Since 1974, federal budget 
rules have required that the president‘s budget and the congressional 
budget resolution include such estimates of revenue foregone as a result of 
tax expenditures.
264
 Accordingly, some tax expenditure data is available. 
Still, this information is not otherwise incorporated into the federal 
budget.
265
 A true measure of aggregate costs demands better budgetary 
incorporation of bailout-type costs incurred through tax expenditures. The 
sections that follow offer illustrations of substantial government bailout-
type intervention through tax expenditures that are not reflected in the 
regular budget. 
2. Net Operating Loss (NOL) Carryovers: Internal Revenue Code 
§ 172 
One tax-expenditure approach to providing bailout-type relief is to 
extend business taxpayers‘ ability to deduct losses for federal income tax 
purposes beyond what would otherwise be permitted. In general, business 
taxpayers are entitled to deduct all of their ordinary and necessary business 
 
 
 262. The concept of a ―tax expenditure budget‖ is generally first attributed to Professor Stanley 
Surrey. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 1–
14 (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1–6 (1985). For 
additional sources on tax expenditures in general, see Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A 
Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155 (1988). For a more recent and excellent account of the tax 
expenditure budget and the relationship between taxing and spending programs, see David A. 
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). 
 263. See sources cited supra note 262. 
 264. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 
Stat. 297, 299 (codified in part at 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(2)(E) (2006)) (defining ―tax expenditure‖ as 
―revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, 
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, 
or a deferral of tax liability‖). The Joint Committee on Taxation regularly publishes estimates on tax 
expenditure costs. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006–2010 (Comm. Print 2006). The President‘s 
annual budget also includes tax expenditure estimates. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL 
YEAR 2011, at 207–23 (2010).  
 265. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND 
NEED TO BE REEXAMINED (2005). 
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expenses from their gross receipts.
266
 For businesses suffering a net loss, 
however, the government does not issue refunds. The tax return of a ―loss 
business‖ simply reports an overall net loss and does not reflect any tax 
liability. In other words, a business with a net loss cannot ―use‖ its loss for 
beneficial tax purposes in the taxable year in which the loss was incurred. 
Absent special rules permitting taxpayers to carry such a loss back to 
offset income from a prior year‘s tax return or forward to offset income on 
a future year‘s return, taxpayers would be denied the opportunity to ever 
deduct losses resulting from their ―net loss‖ years.267 Fortunately for 
taxpayers, Congress has adopted special NOL carryover rules, which 
generally authorize taxpayers to carry net operating losses back to two 
preceding taxable years and forward to twenty subsequent years.
268
  
Imagine, for example, a business that paid federal income tax in prior 
profitable years, but now faces substantial economic losses. Carrying 
current losses back to prior profitable years will result in tax refunds for 
those earlier years, thus providing the struggling business with much-
needed cash. By expanding the number of prior years to which taxpayers 
can carry back losses, Congress can put more cash in eligible taxpayers‘ 
hands, thus providing bailout-type relief. This is precisely what Congress 
did with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, when it 
permitted small business taxpayers to carry back their 2008 net operating 
losses for up to five, rather than two, years.
269
 Congress later extended the 
temporary five-year loss carryback to cover both 2008 and 2009 net 
operating losses and expanded it to cover taxpayers generally, rather than 
limiting it to small businesses.
270
 As one tax watchdog group noted, 
although the legislation was billed overall as a ―stimulus‖ package, the 
NOL provision simply made it ―easier for corporations to use tax losses to 
 
 
 266. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006) (permitting deductions for ordinary and necessary business 
expenses).  
 267. In Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
federal tax regime‘s strict adherence to a rigid annual accounting system, rejecting the taxpayer‘s 
argument that disallowing the loss deduction resulted in an unconstitutional tax on receipts that were 
not ―income‖ as defined in the Sixteenth Amendment. Congress responded by statutorily overruling 
the result in Sanford & Brooks with special net operating loss provisions. Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 3 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 172) (2006)). 
 268. 26 U.S.C. § 172(b) (2006). A ―net operating loss‖ is defined as ―the excess of the deductions 
allowed . . . over gross income.‖ 26 U.S.C. § 172(c) (2006). 
 269. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1211, 123 Stat. 115, 335 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(H)). 
Congress had previously enacted a permanent rule permitting a five-year net operating loss carryback 
for ―qualified disaster losses.‖ Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 708, 122 Stat. 3765, 3924–25 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(J), (j) ). 
 270. Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-92, § 13, 
123 Stat. 2984, 2992 (to be codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 172(b)(1)(H)). 
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get a refund of taxes paid in prior years (i.e., to get a check from the IRS) 
while doing nothing to change companies‘ incentives to invest or create 
jobs.‖271 The NOL extension provision was more bailout than stimulus. 
The inclusion of a special provision disallowing the expanded five-year 
carryback to those otherwise receiving TARP assistance confirms the 
bailout focus of this legislation.
272
  
3. Loss Limitations Following Corporate Ownership Changes: 
Internal Revenue Code § 382 
Tax expenditure bailout-type relief also includes relaxation of loss 
limitation rules that would otherwise apply following a corporate 
acquisition. Those seeking investment opportunities sometimes 
counterintuitively target struggling, rather than healthy, businesses for 
acquisition. A struggling corporation‘s NOLs can be attractive to a 
potential buyer if those NOLs can be used to offset the acquiring 
corporation‘s income from other sources. Similarly, a troubled 
corporation‘s ―built-in‖ losses from decline in the value of its assets can be 
attractive to a purchaser if those built-in losses can later be used to offset 
gains from other sources. Congress responded to this type of ―loss 
trafficking‖ with complex loss limitation rules in § 382 that apply 
following certain ownership changes. 
The general issue addressed by § 382 is the extent to which a 
corporation‘s existing losses may continue to offset income following a 
significant ownership change. Most often, the primary concern of § 382 is 
the extent to which an acquiring business may use losses or other tax 
attributes of the acquired ―loss company.‖273 Prohibiting any future use of 
such losses might deprive the acquired company, under new ownership, of 
losses to which it would have been entitled had it not been acquired. On 
the other hand, unrestricted future use of such losses would encourage 
―loss trafficking.‖ Congress responded with a compromise that uses a 
 
 
 271. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, THE SIX WORST TAX CUTS IN THE SENATE STIMULUS BILL 4 
(2009), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/sixworsttaxcuts.pdf. Another bailout-like provision in the 
so-called stimulus legislation was a temporary rule allowing taxpayers to elect to spread the reporting 
of discharge of indebtedness income over a five-year period. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1231, 123 Stat. 115, 
338 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108(i)).  
 272. Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 § 13(f). 
 273. The § 382 loss restrictions are not limited to major corporate acquisitions, however. They are 
triggered by any ―ownership change,‖ defined to include any increase by more than fifty percentage 
points of any five-percent shareholder, within a specified testing period. 26 U.S.C. § 382(g) (2006). 
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mathematical formula to impose limits on the use of a ―loss corporation‘s‖ 
NOLs and other built-in losses following a major ownership change.
274
  
Given the potential future value of a troubled corporation‘s NOLs and 
built-in losses, it is not surprising that ―loss corporations‖—along with 
their potential investors—are intensely interested in the extent to which 
the NOLs and built-in losses survive an acquisition or a restructuring in 
bankruptcy. Absent special statutory relief, one particular concern through 
the 2009 economic turmoil surrounding General Motors, for example, was 
that the Treasury Department‘s ultimate sale of GM stock received in the 
bankruptcy restructuring would constitute an ―ownership change,‖ thus 
triggering § 382 NOL loss limitation rules.
275
 Congress responded by 
adding a new subparagraph to § 382, providing that its loss limitation rules 
do not apply to an ownership change ―pursuant to a restructuring plan‖ 
that was ―required under a loan agreement or a commitment for a line of 
credit entered into with the Department of Treasury‖ under EESA.276 The 
provision‘s narrow terms made it clear that it had been specifically drafted 
to provide additional bailout-type relief for General Motors.
277
 The Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that the revenue foregone from 
this tax expenditure over the period from 2009–2019 would be 
approximately $3.2 billion.
278
 
4. Reporting Ordinary Losses From Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Stock Sales 
Corporate taxpayers ordinarily may deduct capital losses only to offset 
capital gains;
279
 a corporation with no capital gains cannot deduct capital 
 
 
 274. 26 U.S.C. § 382 (2006).  
 275. In a critical determination for General Motors as it emerged from bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy 
Court found that its ―net operating loss carryforwards (‗NOLs‘) and certain other tax attributes . . . 
[were] property . . . protected by . . . the Bankruptcy Code.‖ Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
sections 105(a) and 362 Establishing Notification Procedures and Approving Restrictions on Certain 
Transfers of Interests in the Debtors’ Estates, In re General Motors Corp., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2009), available at 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 131–19.  
 276. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1262, 123 Stat. 115, 
225, 343–44. Using its interpretive authority, the Treasury Department issued similar announcements 
regarding the use of NOLs and built-in losses in other transactional contexts. See infra notes 306–23 
and accompanying text. 
 277. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Even After the Deal, Tinkering Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
13, 2009, at A20 (reporting the new provision as a ―tax break specifically intended for the failing auto 
giant General Motors‖).  
 278. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE ―AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009‖ (Feb. 12, 
2009). 
 279. 26 U.S.C. § 1211(a) (2006). Stock held for investment generally is considered a capital asset. 
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losses from its ordinary income. As a consequence, corporate taxpayers 
may find themselves with ―unused capital losses,‖ much in the same way 
that they may have unused NOLs.
280
 In addition to relaxing NOL 
deduction restrictions, Congress has provided bailout-type assistance 
through exceptions to otherwise applicable limitations on capital-loss 
deductions. During the 2008–2009 economic crisis, for example, many 
financial institutions held Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock 
that had substantially decreased in value. Absent a special rule, they would 
not have been able to deduct capital losses resulting from the sale of this 
stock to offset ordinary income. Congress stepped in with a temporary tax 
break, permitting financial institutions selling certain Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac preferred stock within a specified time frame to treat those 
sales as generating ordinary loss.
281
 The revenue foregone for 2008–2012 
as a result of this specially-targeted tax break was estimated by the JCT at 
approximately $3.4 billion.
282
 
5. Budgetary Concerns 
Given that tax expenditure information is available but not otherwise 
incorporated into the federal budget, tax expenditures are, in general, more 
hidden than other budgetary costs. This, in itself, is troublesome. Along 
these lines, the Government Accountability Office has recommended more 
broadly that tax expenditures be presented ―in the budget together with 
related outlay programs to show a truer picture of the federal support 
within a mission area.‖283  
Of special concern in the bailout setting is that most of the tax 
expenditures discussed in the preceding sections are targeted provisions, 
designed to assist a particular business or industry in economic distress. 
Although always important, transparency and accounting accuracy should 
be especially emphasized when individual businesses or select industries 
 
 
See 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (2006).  
 280. See supra notes 266–68 and accompanying text. As with NOLs, Congress has provided 
limited rules for capital loss carrybacks and carryforwards. 26 U.S.C. § 1212 (2006).  
 281. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 301(a), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3802 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5261 (2006)); see also id. § 301(b)(2) (defining 
eligible preferred stock to include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock held by a qualified financial 
institution on September 6, 2008, or sold or exchanged on or after January 1, 2008, and before 
September 7, 2008).  
 282. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012 (Comm. Print 2008). 
 283. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND 
NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 73 (2005). 
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receive targeted assistance. Moreover, the addition of tax expenditure 
bailout-type relief to the already-fragmented assortment of other direct 
spending bailout programs makes it even more difficult for Congress or 
the Treasury Department to realize how much is spent on related efforts. 
Before providing additional assistance, those with power over the various 
purses should have information on aggregate government resources 
already devoted through tax expenditures and other devices. Absent such 
information, different units of government effectively issue checks on 
different accounts without the ability to balance the overall checkbook or 
see the total picture.  
B. Relief Through Tax Administration and Regulations 
1. Bailout Through Relaxed Agency Interpretation of Tax Provisions 
Government bailout-type assistance can also be provided through 
regulatory or interpretive actions of administrative agencies. This more 
covert type of bailout raises dual concerns. First, the existence of such 
government intervention is less visible to the public. Second, the costs of 
such intervention can be difficult to measure and will not be reflected in 
budgetary and agency financial documents. Unlike legislatively enacted 
tax expenditures, for which there is at least some budgetary information, 
nothing in the budget captures the costs of such administrative action.  
The Treasury Department is probably the agency most able to provide 
economic assistance to struggling businesses through administrative 
action.
284
 When statutory language lends itself to alternate meanings, most 
probably assume that the IRS will choose the approach that generates the 
greatest tax revenue. This is not always so. By relaxing its interpretation or 
application of tax rules in the taxpayer‘s favor, the Treasury Department 
can—and often does—reduce tax liability for certain taxpayers, thus 
offering bailout-type relief. Particularly during the latter part of 2008 
through 2009, an empathetic IRS issued a number of pronouncements that 
significantly reduced tax liability for a number of taxpayers.
285
 By many 
accounts, the IRS, in some cases, went beyond simply choosing between 
 
 
 284. The Chief Counsel‘s office within the IRS generally issues regulatory and other interpretative 
guidance, along with the Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL §§ 32.1.1.1, 32.1.1.3.1 [hereinafter IRS MANUAL]. For purposes of 
discussing agency interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, this Article uses the terms IRS and 
Treasury Department interchangeably. 
 285. For a detailed discussion of bailout-type Treasury Department interpretations of loss rules, 
see infra notes 306–23 and accompanying text.  
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plausible, alternative meanings of statutory text and instead made 
pronouncements that were inconsistent with the statute and contrary to 
congressional intent.
286
 Whether or not the IRS, in fact, exceeded its 
authority, these recent events provide an important reminder of the ways 
in which administrative action can provide bailout-type assistance. The 
sections that follow first provide some background on procedural rules 
applicable to the Treasury Department‘s exercise of its interpretative 
authority before turning to discussion of specific Treasury Department 
bailout-like actions during the 2008–2009 economic crisis. 
2. IRS Interpretive Authority and the Administrative Procedure Act 
Congress has delegated authority to execute and enforce the Internal 
Revenue Code to the Treasury Department,
287
 which exercises this 
authority through different types of IRS pronouncements, including formal 
regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices.
288
 For 
purposes of promulgating rules, the IRS is generally subject to the same 
procedural requirements applicable to all executive agencies under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
289
 Among other mandates, the APA 
generally requires agencies to issue notices of proposed rulemaking and 
provide an opportunity for public comment, a process often referred to as 
―informal rulemaking.‖290 In addition to the statutory APA requirements, 
agencies are required by presidential executive order to carefully consider 
the costs and benefits of proposed rules or regulations.
291
 A formal, 
 
 
 286. See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Can Obama’s IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank 
Giveaway?, 122 TAX NOTES 889, 889 (2009) (describing one such notice as providing ―no explanation 
of the legal basis for its exemption of banks from the strictures of section 382, and no such basis is 
apparent on the face of the statute, in the legislative history, in judicial interpretations, or in prior 
administrative interpretations‖). 
 287. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2006) (granting general Treasury Department authority to promulgate 
―all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement‖ of the Internal Revenue Code). 
 288. For a useful description of these different types of pronouncements, see Irving Salem et al., 
ABA Section of Taxation: Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 728–32 
(2004) [hereinafter Task Force Report]; see also MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE (rev. 2d ed. 2003). 
 289. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552–596.  
 290. Formal rulemaking, which has become increasingly rare, applies only to agency action 
required by statute to be made ―on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.‖ 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 553(c), 556, 557 (2006). For a general description of informal and formal rulemaking, see RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.2 (4th ed. 2002). 
 291. Such requirements were initially introduced by President Reagan, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 127 (1981) (Reagan administration order on agency regulations). President Clinton 
subsequently revoked and replaced the Reagan administration order with Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 
Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The Clinton order, which is still in effect, reaffirmed most of the 
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documented cost-benefit assessment is required for any ―significant 
regulatory action,‖292 including actions that may have ―an annual effect on 
the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way 
the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, [or] jobs 
. . . .‖293  
One major statutory exception to APA procedural requirements is 
provided for ―interpretative rules,‖ as opposed to ―legislative rules.‖294 
Courts and commentators have struggled in the absence of a statutory 
definition of ―interpretative rule‖ for purposes of this exception. Modern 
administrative law principles suggest that the most important 
distinguishing feature of legislative rules is that they are legally binding or 
have the force of law.
295
 The IRS takes the position that most of its 
regulations are interpretative and not subject to formal APA rules.
296
 Even 
though it is not required to do so, however, the IRS claims that it usually 
follows APA procedures with respect to regulations that it considers to be 
interpretative.
297
 Many recent bailout-like Treasury Department actions 
were achieved not through regulations, rulings, or procedures, but instead 
through more informal notices.
298
 According to the Internal Revenue 
Manual, ―[a] notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance 
that involves substantive interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code . 
. . .‖299 Such a pronouncement may provide ―final guidance‖ upon which 
 
 
important features of the earlier executive rules. For a discussion of the evolution of these rules, see 
PIERCE, supra note 290, § 7.9 (―Executive Control of Rulemaking‖). 
 292. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,741. 
 293. Id. at 51,738. These administrative requirements apply to proposed ―regulations‖ or ―rules,‖ 
broadly defined to mean ―agency statement[s] of general applicability and future effect, which the 
agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that [are] designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy . . . .‖ Id. at 51,737 (emphasis added).  
 294. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006). Another exception applies ―when the agency for good cause 
finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.‖ Id. § 553(b)(3)(B). 
 295. See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note 290, § 6.3 (stating that ―valid legislative rule has the same 
binding effect as a statute‖); see also id. § 6.4; William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1324–25 (2001).  
 296. Contra Task Force Report, supra note 288, at 741 (arguing that all IRS regulations should be 
considered legislative); see Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack Of) Compliance With Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1794 (2007) (arguing that most IRS regulations are legislative). Based upon her 
empirical study of regulatory projects between 2003 and 2005, Professor Hickman concludes that the 
IRS frequently violates APA requirements. Id. 
 297. IRS MANUAL, supra note 284, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (―Although most IRS/Treasury regulations 
are interpretative, and therefore not subject to [notice and comment] provisions of the APA, the IRS 
usually solicits public comment on all [Notices of Proposed Rulemaking].‖).  
 298. For detailed discussion, see infra notes 306–23 and accompanying text. 
 299. IRS MANUAL, supra note 284, § 32.2.2.3.3. 
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taxpayers may rely and which precludes IRS attorneys from making a 
contrary argument.
300
 To my mind, these notices have the force of law and 
should be classified as ―legislative,‖ therefore subject to formal APA and 
additional executive order requirements.
301
 In contrast to its ―voluntary‖ 
use of notice and comment for regulatory projects, the IRS does not even 
purport to follow such procedures for revenue rulings, procedures, or 
notices. Congress should amend the APA to clarify that Treasury 
Department interpretations—which bind the IRS and upon which 
taxpayers may rely—require notice and comment, as well as cost-benefit 
analysis. This clarification rule should include an exception, however, for 
emergency circumstances requiring a rapid agency response.  
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the IRS 
Whether it takes the form of a regulation, revenue ruling, or notice, tax 
consequences resulting from particular events or transactions can differ 
dramatically depending upon the particular IRS interpretation of statutory 
language. Imperfect as they are, the tax expenditure budget rules 
applicable to legislative actions at least provide some mechanism for 
reflecting the federal budgetary impact of special tax breaks. Tax breaks 
that result from ―taxpayer-friendly‖ IRS statutory interpretations may cost 
as much in foregone revenue as legislated tax expenditures; yet, these 
costs are not reflected anywhere in budgetary documents or agency 
financial statements. Moreover, the IRS generally does not offer any cost-
benefit analysis as it promulgates regulations, rulings, notices, or other 
pronouncements.  
To be sure, taxpayer-friendly interpretative rules are not necessarily 
always bad. Some Treasury Department determinations may well reflect 
good policy choices. At the same time, there are reasons for concern. At a 
minimum, administrative agencies should not be authorized to provide 
relief when their actions would be inconsistent with existing statutory 
rules. Administrative intervention clearly should not be used as a device to 
bypass Congress to implement changes that should be enacted through the 
legislative process. As a procedural matter, the IRS should be required to 
report the costs of revenue foregone when it implements a significant 
taxpayer-friendly change in statutory interpretation or regulatory 
implementation. In fact, to the extent practicable, the IRS should engage in 
a cost-benefit analysis of significant pronouncements, as envisioned by the 
 
 
 300. See Task Force Report, supra note 288, at 730–31. 
 301. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. 
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executive orders that apply to administrative agencies generally. In some 
respects, requiring cost-benefit analysis may be less burdensome for the 
IRS than for other agencies, which often confront hard-to-value costs and 
benefits—the cost of illness or loss of human life or the benefits of cleaner 
air, for example.
302
 In contrast, the financial costs and benefits the IRS 
would consider should be easier to monetize.
303
 
Application of cost-benefit analysis in the context of bailout-type 
administrative agency intervention and, in particular, a focus on 
government costs might appear to be somewhat unusual. There is a 
tendency to consider regulatory cost-benefit analysis as focused on 
whether the benefits of burdensome regulation justify the costs imposed 
on private individuals or business. For example, a cost-benefit analysis of 
a rule proposing stricter pollutant emission limits would ask whether the 
health and other environmental benefits of the proposed rule sufficiently 
justify the costs imposed upon manufacturers and consumers.
304
 But a full 
cost-benefit analysis should require examination of the costs and benefits 
to all, including the government.
305
  
4. A Case Study of Hidden Bailout and the Need for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
a. Relaxed IRS Loss Restriction Rule Interpretations 
During the 2008–2009 economic turmoil, the IRS became active in 
―bailout-type administrative intervention‖ through a series of notices 
announcing the Treasury Department‘s relaxed position in applying § 382 
loss limitation rules. These Treasury Department § 382 interpretations fall 
 
 
 302. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
953, 957 (1997) (discussing the adequacy of normative economics to measure nonmonetary costs, such 
as health). 
 303. For a similar argument for imposing stricter cost-benefit analysis requirements upon financial 
regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, see Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Lessons from the SEC’s Stalled Mutual Fund Reform Effort, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006). 
 304. The tendency to think of cost-benefit analysis in light of the burdens imposed by heavy 
regulation is reflected in the OMB guidelines to agencies, which instruct that there should be a 
―presumption against certain types of regulat[ion]‖ which might be unintentionally harmful or impede 
market efficiency. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4: 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 6 (2003). 
 305. One study of government agency cost-benefit analysis found that agencies generally estimate 
the cost of regulations on producers, but often do not estimate costs to the federal or state 
governments. Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Cost-
Benefit Analysis? 10 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-01, 
2007). 
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into two categories. First, several pronouncements address ownership 
changes from transfers of stock and warrants acquired by the Treasury 
Department itself under various TARP programs. For example, the 
Treasury Department announced that a § 382 ―ownership change‖ would 
not be triggered when a corporation that received a capital infusion from 
certain TARP programs in exchange for preferred stock or warrants repaid 
the government through a later redemption or repurchase of those shares 
or warrants.
306
 Subsequent rulings expanded the exemption from § 382 to 
cover other TARP programs and to cover redemption or purchase of 
common stock and indebtedness.
307
 In another notice, apparently issued 
with Citigroup in mind, the IRS announced that the Treasury Department‘s 
sale of stock earlier acquired under TARP would not trigger a § 382 
―ownership change‖ even if the sale was to public shareholders.308 The 
latter notice ―attracted criticism as an additional subsidy to Citigroup and a 
loss to the taxpayers.‖309 One tax expert remarked, ―I‘ve been doing taxes 
for almost 40 years, and I‘ve never seen anything like this, where the IRS 
and Treasury acted unilaterally on so many fronts.‖310  
Critical assessment of the Treasury Department‘s § 382 TARP 
interpretations is difficult. On the one hand, transfers covered by the IRS 
notices fit the literal statutory ―change of ownership‖ definition. Yet, 
applying loss limitation rules to changes of government stock ownership 
pursuant to TARP is arguably inconsistent with the underlying 
congressional purpose—to prevent trafficking. Ultimate cost to the 
taxpayer is also difficult to measure. In the case of Citigroup, application 
of the § 382 loss limitation rules would have restricted the company‘s 
ability to deduct losses, which would have increased its tax liability, thus 
reducing its capital. As an equity investor, the U.S. government itself was 
concerned with potential declines in stock value. It is difficult to calculate 
whether any loss of value in the government‘s Citigroup stock resulting 
 
 
 306. I.R.S. Notice 2008-100, 2008-1 C.B. 1081 (―Application of Section 382 To Loss 
Corporations Whose Instruments Are Acquired By The Treasury Department Under The Capital 
Purchase Program Pursuant To The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008‖).  
 307. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2009-38, 2009-1 C.B. 901; I.R.S. Notice 2009-14, 2009-1 C.B. 516. 
 308. I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251; see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY 
OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 16–
22 (2010) (discussing § 382 tax issues and Treasury Department rulings under TARP). 
 309. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING 
ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 20 (2010). A Senate bill was even introduced to legislatively 
rescind the notice. S. 2916, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 310. Binyamin Appelbaum, Tax Deal is Worth Billions to Citigroup; Deal Made to Recover 
Bailout Firms Exempted from Rule When U.S. Sells its Stake, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1 
(quoting Robert Willens). 
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from § 382 restrictions would have exceeded the revenue foregone from 
the § 382 exemption. Still, exempting Citigroup and other TARP-
participant stock sales from § 382 loss limitation rules might have been an 
attempt to protect the value of the government‘s investment.  
Even though there may be reasonable policy justifications for the 
Treasury Department‘s actions, its declaration of § 382 exemptions by fiat 
is still troubling because it suggests differential access to the government 
for quick tax relief. Although the individual notices did not mention 
particular taxpayers by name, most were triggered at the behest—or, at 
least, in the interests—of individual large financial institutions. Smaller, 
less influential taxpayers may not have access to similar relief. In addition, 
as the TARP Oversight Panel observed, ―the EESA notices, however 
sound in themselves, illustrate again the inherent conflict implicit in 
Treasury‘s administration of TARP. In this case the conflict is a three-way 
one, pitting Treasury‘s responsibilities as TARP administrator, regulator, 
and tax administrator against one another.‖311 Most significant from the 
budgetary perspective, the notices announcing exemptions from § 382 loss 
limitation rules clearly involved cost to the government in revenue 
foregone. If such relief had been achieved through legislation, Congress 
would have had access to information from the JCT‘s estimates of revenue 
foregone. Instead, this indirect bailout was accomplished through agency 
action, without budgetary impact estimates, notice-and-comment 
procedures, or cost-benefit analysis. 
A second, and more troubling, category of § 382 relief announced 
through Treasury Department notices did not involve TARP or other 
government assistance programs. Instead, the Treasury Department 
stepped in to facilitate private acquisition of certain troubled banks by 
making the acquisitions less expensive. Toward the end of 2008, merger-
and-acquisition activity dramatically increased as apparently healthier 
institutions—with some government prodding—acquired banks and other 
financial entities faced with potential collapse. Not surprisingly, the § 382 
loss limitation rules were of tremendous interest to potential acquirers. A 
bank acquisition surely is more attractive when the purchaser is assured 
that it can use the distressed bank‘s losses to offset future income.  
Notice 2008-83 announced that the IRS would not consider a bank 
deduction for losses on loans or bad debts following an ownership change 
as a built-in loss for purposes of the § 382 restrictions.
312
 In other words, 
 
 
 311. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING 
ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 22 (2010). 
 312. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, § 2, 2008-42 I.R.B. 905. 
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an acquiring bank was permitted to deduct the built-in losses of the 
acquired bank. Taxpayers were advised that they could ―rely on the 
treatment set forth in this notice, unless and until there is further 
guidance,‖313 language suggesting a ―legislative‖ pronouncement, at least 
arguably subject to APA notice and cost-benefit analysis rules.
314
 
Responding to a Washington Post reporter, one Treasury Department 
spokesman described the notice as ―part of our overall effort to provide 
relief‖ and conceded that the Department did not estimate the costs of the 
tax change.
315
 Assuming that these comments accurately reflect IRS views, 
it seems clear that the Treasury Department was consciously and 
deliberately providing bailout-type relief through changes in its 
interpretation of the tax law—a ―hidden‖ bailout. 
At the time this notice was released, Congress was debating emergency 
bailout legislation, and Citigroup and Wells Fargo were competing to 
acquire control of Wachovia. Before the notice, it appeared that Wells 
Fargo‘s bid had failed and that Citigroup would acquire Wachovia.316 
According to observers, the tax savings from this dramatic change in IRS 
interpretation of the § 382 loss limitation rules enabled Wells Fargo, 
which had actively lobbied for the change, to make a new and successful 
bid.
317
 Other banks subsequently took advantage of the ruling. Some 
estimated that the overall cost to taxpayers would be between $100 and 
$140 billion.
318
  
The Institute of Foreign Bankers, hoping to take advantage of the 
relaxed loss limitation rule, quickly wrote to Treasury Secretary Paulson, 
urging expansion of the ruling to non-U.S.-headquartered financial 
institutions.
319
 Angry members of the House Ways & Means Committee 
 
 
 313. Id. § 3. This Article focuses only on Notice 2008-83 by way of illustration. The IRS issued 
numerous other taxpayer-favorable notices during 2008. For a description of these other actions, see, 
for example, Amy S. Elliott, Year in Review: Treasury Provides Certainty and Relief in Economic 
Crisis, 122 TAX NOTES 47 (Jan. 5, 2009). See also Stephen Gandel, New Tax Rules: The Hidden 
Corporate Bailout, TIME, Dec. 10, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1865315,00.html. 
 314. See discussion supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text. 
 315. Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks: With Attention on Bailout Debate, Treasury 
Made Change to Tax Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 316. See Eric Dash & Ben White, Wells Fargo Swoops In, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at C1 
(describing Wells Fargo‘s outbidding of Citigroup for Wachovia after a ―little-noticed move . . . by the 
Internal Revenue Service, which restored tax breaks for banks that take big losses on bad loans 
inherited through acquisitions‖). 
 317. See Paley, supra note 315 (quoting the Jones Day law firm as saying that the ruling ―could be 
worth about $25 billion for Wells Fargo‖). 
 318. Id. (estimates from corporate tax expert Robert Willens and the Jones Day law firm). 
 319. Letter from Lawrence R. Uhlick, Chief Exec. Officer, Inst. of Int‘l Bankers, to Henry 
Paulson, Sec‘y of the Treasury (Nov. 10, 2008), reprinted in 2008 TNT 224–25.  
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wrote to oppose such expansion of the IRS ―backdoor bailout.‖320 An even 
angrier Senator Chuck Grassley, Senate Finance Committee ranking 
minority member, requested that the Treasury Department Inspector 
General look into possible conflicts of interest.
321
  
The saga of Notice 2008-83 continued, leading to a remarkable 
statutory rebuke of the Treasury Department in a provision labeled a 
―clarification,‖ which was included in the stimulus package passed by 
Congress in early 2009:  
 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds as follows: 
 (1) The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury 
under section 382(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does 
not authorize the Secretary to provide exemptions or special rules 
that are restricted to particular industries or classes of taxpayers. 
 (2) Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with 
the congressional intent in enacting such section 382(m). 
 (3) The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service 
Notice 2008-83 is doubtful.
322
 
Congress clearly disagreed with the IRS interpretation in Notice 2008-83 
and even questioned its legal authority. At the same time, Congress felt it 
necessary to protect reliance interests of taxpayers who completed or made 
binding bank acquisition contracts on the strength of the IRS notice. Thus, 
the legislative clarification provided that Notice 2008-83 would have the 
force and effect of law only for ownership changes that took place before 
January 16, 2009, and to ownership changes after this date that were 
pursuant to a written binding contract before then.
323
 In other words, the 
rules included a ―grandfather‖ clause, giving the benefit of the Treasury 
Department‘s favorable interpretation to existing contracts—the Wells 
Fargo transaction, in particular. 
 
 
 320. Letter from Ways & Means Comm. Members to Henry Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury 
(Dec. 4, 2008), reprinted in 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 235–19 (Dec. 5, 2008). 
 321. Letter from Chuck Grassley, U.S. Senator, to Eric M. Thorson, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of 
the Treasury (Nov. 14, 2008), reprinted in 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 222–73 (Nov. 17, 2008). 
 322. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261(a), 123 Stat. 
115, 342–43. 
 323. Id. § 1261(b). 
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b. Estimating the Costs and Lessons From Notice 2008-83  
Although it is but one incident, the Notice 2008-83 hidden bailout saga 
offers important lessons for the future. First, it illustrates that the IRS 
engages in more ―legislative‖-type regulation than it publicly 
acknowledges. Whether through regulation, ruling, or notice, the IRS 
should comply with informal rulemaking requirements whenever it 
announces a significant change in interpretation of the tax code. Second, in 
the narrow context of bailouts, the story confirms that regulatory agencies 
engage in bailout-like activities through their administrative actions. 
Third, a specific targeted change in IRS interpretation of the tax code can 
actually decrease tax liabilities for the parties to particular economic 
transactions. Although the precise federal revenues to be gained or lost 
from a particular interpretive change may sometimes be difficult to 
estimate, a reasonable estimation of the cost or benefit will often be 
possible. Surely individual taxpayers who stood to benefit from Notice 
2008-83‘s relaxation of § 382 loss limitations had some notion of the tax 
break‘s approximate value.324 This value to the targeted beneficiaries, of 
course, is foregone revenue to the government. The revenue foregone as a 
result of Notice 2008-83 is an example of a very real government expense 
not reflected anywhere in agency financial statements or the federal 
budget.  
Whether through statutory amendment or executive order, I believe that 
the Treasury Department should be required to comply with statutory APA 
requirements, including cost-benefit analysis. At a minimum, the IRS 
should be required to generate cost-benefit estimates of its major 
pronouncements and make them available to Congress and to the public. 
In emergency circumstances leaving little time for cost-benefit analysis, 
even after-the-fact estimates could, at least, increase transparency and 
enable Congress to make its policy decisions about future bailout efforts 
with more complete information.  
Setting aside the question of whether Notice 2008-83 was within the 
IRS‘s authority, a full cost-benefit analysis would have enabled the 
Department to make a better-informed policy decision. Albeit unlikely, 
economic analysis might have revealed that relaxing § 382 loss limitation 
rules would produce revenue to the extent that failing firms were thereby 
rescued and strengthened. The best possible cost-benefit information 
should be available and shared among the various units of government that 
 
 
 324. See Paley, supra note 315. 
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are involved in bailout relief efforts. Only in this way can policymakers 
make informed choices regarding appropriate aggregate expenditure 
amounts and appropriate aggregate allocations to individual firm or 
industry recipients. 
c. Notice 2008-83 and Budget Scoring  
Problems with accurately measuring the budgetary impact of Notice 
2008-83 were dramatically exacerbated by revenue estimates 
accompanying the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act‘s 
―clarification‖ provision, through which Congress effectively ―revoked‖ 
the Treasury Department notice. The JCT is required to provide revenue 
estimates for proposed legislation—referred to as the legislation‘s score.325 
In this case, the JCT scored the clarification provision limiting the force 
and effect of Notice 2008-83 as raising revenue.
326
 This is just bizarre. 
The congressional ―clarification‖ provision simply declared that the IRS 
interpretation was wrong, thus reinstating the status quo. The initial cost of 
the IRS rule change was never taken into budgetary account. Yet, since 
Notice 2008-83 was never formally declared invalid, JCT revenue 
estimators started from the assumption that this Notice was the law.
327
 In 
other words, estimators assumed, as a baseline, that acquiring companies 
could use preacquisition losses. To generate revenue estimates for the 
statutory clarification provision in the stimulus bill, estimators next 
worked from assumptions about economic growth and levels of 
anticipated future merger-and-acquisition activity and calculated how 
much additional revenue the IRS would receive if purchasing companies 
were not allowed to use the preacquisition losses of the acquired company.  
Revenue estimating and scoring rules that treat the stimulus bill‘s 
―clarification‖ provision as raising revenue are problematic. Before 
scoring the reversal of a rule change as a revenue raiser, estimators should 
have taken into account the cost of the initial change. The stakes here are 
high: provisions that are scored as raising revenue can be used under 
various ―pay-as-you-go‖ budget rules or other congressionally determined 
offset requirements to ―pay for‖ other measures that increase spending or 
decrease revenue. This in turn increases the potential for budget 
 
 
 325. 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2006). 
 326. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE ―AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009‖ (2009).  
 327. Telephone Interview with Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation (Mar. 
6, 2009) (notes on file with author). 
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gimmicking. Mechanisms should be included in scoring procedures and 
rules to free estimators from some of the constraints imposed under the 
existing procedure‘s definition of what constitutes current law. Scoring 
rules in this instance should not have required estimators to assume that 
Notice 2008-83 was valid law for purposes of estimating the budgetary 
impact of its reversal. This is not to suggest, however, that estimators 
should have free reign with respect to defining baselines. To the extent 
that estimators are given discretion in defining baselines, checks would 
need to be in place to avoid any abuse of such discretion. 
C. Other Hidden Bailout Costs 
1. Nontax Regulatory Relief 
Another form of covert or hidden bailout is to provide businesses with 
exemptions from their obligations to comply with otherwise burdensome 
and costly regulatory requirements. Automobile manufacturers, for 
instance, often complain that the cost of complying with increasingly 
stringent environmental regulation is a major contributing factor to their 
financial woes.
328
 During the late 1980s, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), apparently responding to complaints of financial distress, 
granted General Motors and other automobile manufacturers a waiver 
from their obligation to comply with carbon monoxide emissions 
standards.
329
 Based on financial distress within the industry, the steel 
industry similarly obtained a legislative exemption from Clean Air Act 
obligations.
330
 As another example, in the aftermath of the devastating 
2005 hurricane season on the Gulf Coast, the EPA announced temporary 
waivers from gasoline and diesel fuel standards,
331
 and legislation was 
introduced that would have permitted more extensive waivers from 
 
 
 328. See, e.g., The Chrysler Corporation Financial Situation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. 86–87 (1979) 
(testimony of Lee Iacocca).  
 329. E.P.A. Lifts Deadline on Pollution Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1981, at D24 (reporting EPA 
grant of two-year delay to certain ―financially troubled‖ automakers in implementing exhaust emission 
standards).  
 330. Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-23, 95 Stat. 139 (repealed 
1990). The House Report explained that ―[t]he Committee is proposing that the extension be limited 
solely to the steel industry since no other industry is experiencing such unique hardships.‖ H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-121, at 9 (1981). For discussion of other relief from compliance obligation-type bailouts, see 
Block, Bailouts, supra note 22, at 970–72. 
 331. Pamela Najor, Nationwide Waiver on Fuel Specification Granted by EPA Due to Hurricane, 
[2005] 169 Daily Env‘t Rep. (BNA), at A-1 (Sept. 1, 2005) (reporting temporary EPA Clean Air Act 
waivers). 
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otherwise-applicable environmental regulations.
332
 Although the stated 
rationale for these measures was to protect the fuel supply, government 
bailout-type assistance to a potentially economically threatened fuel 
industry also played an important part. 
Not surprisingly, the budget does not include the costs of such 
compliance waivers or exemptions. It would be difficult to measure the net 
discounted present value of health costs imposed by a two-year delay in 
implementation of air pollution standards. Nevertheless, some effort 
should be made to include these costs. 
2. Moral Hazard and Implicit Guarantees 
Like it or not, extraordinary government interventions to rescue 
troubled financial institutions and other business entities have changed 
public expectations. Having set this precedent, Congress will find it more 
difficult to ignore pleas for future assistance. This notion of ―implicit 
guarantee‖ is hardly new. Despite disclaimers and disclosures to the 
contrary, investors in GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac historically 
persisted in their beliefs—since proven to be accurate—in an implicit 
federal government guarantee.
333
 Although there is some disagreement 
over accounting methodology, reasonable estimates of GSE implicit 
guarantees are available, and such figures arguably should have been 
included in the federal budget.
334
 TARP and other recent government 
interventions surely have expanded the scope of such implicit guarantees. 
As noted by the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel, TARP‘s legacy is 
―an implicit government guarantee, the limits of which are unknown and 
the reasons for which are not fully articulated.”335 And, despite all the 
congressional ―too big to fail‖ and ―no more taxpayer-funded bailout‖ 
clamor included in recent financial reform legislation, bailouts in the 
future are likely if circumstances become sufficiently severe.  
 
 
 332. See, e.g., S. 1711, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 333. For general discussion of the implicit GSE guarantee, see Carol J. Perry, Note, Rethinking 
Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1760–61 (2009); David 
Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: 
Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008). See also discussion supra notes 175–
206 and accompanying text. 
 334. See, e.g., Michael T. Gapen, Evaluating the Implicit Guarantee to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac Using Contingent Claims, 10 INT‘L FIN. REV. 329 (2009); Deborah Lucas & Robert McDonald, 
Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited, in MEASURING AND MANAGING 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISK 131 (Deborah Lucas ed., 2010); Wayne Passmore, The GSE Implicit 
Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity, 33 REAL EST. ECON. 465 (2005). 
 335. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING 
ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 14 (2010). 
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At least with respect to the large financial entities that are ―too big to 
fail‖ or those that present ―substantial systemic risk,‖ the government 
should assign values to contingent future bailout costs. Noting that the 
valuation process has become much more sophisticated over the last 
decade, one government guarantee expert argues that recognizing the cost 
now really is ―the only way to prepare for a contingency like a meltdown 
of the financial system.‖336 
VI. WALL STREET REFORM ACT—A POSTCRIPT 
Congress passed the Wall Street Reform Act, which became law in 
July 2010,
337
 in direct response to the economic crisis that reached its peak 
in 2008 and 2009. The heart of the Act‘s response to potential future 
economic crisis is an institutional framework contained in two of the Act‘s 
sixteen titles.
338
 Title I, the Financial Stability Act of 2010,
339
 creates a 
new Financial Stability Oversight Council,
340
 charged with identifying 
financial stability risks, promoting market discipline by eliminating any 
expectation of government bailouts, and responding to emerging threats to 
stability of the financial system.
341
 This title includes procedures for 
official Council or Federal Reserve Board determinations regarding threats 
to financial stability posed by nonbank financial companies or bank 
holding companies.
342
 Once made, an official threat determination may 
trigger early regulatory intervention, application of more stringent 
regulatory standards than those otherwise applicable, or placement of a 
nonbank financial company under the supervision of the Federal 
Reserve.
343
 Government actions envisioned under the Financial Stability 
Act in title I are focused on stepping in with enhanced regulatory oversight 
in order to prevent the potential threat to financial stability from triggering 
 
 
 336. See Gretchen Morgenson, Future Bailouts of America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at B1 
(quoting Marvin Phaup, George Washington University research scholar and former CBO researcher). 
 337. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 1105, 124 Stat. 1376, 2121–25. 
 338. Id. tit. I (Financial Stability); tit. II (Orderly Liquidation Authority). 
 339. Id. § 101 (short title). 
 340. Id. § 111(a). Voting members of the Council include the Treasury Secretary, Federal Reserve 
Board Chair, Comptroller of the Currency, the heads of other banking and investment-related federal 
agencies, and an independent member with insurance expertise appointed by the president. Id. 
§ 111(b).  
 341. Id. § 112(a). The Act establishes an Office of Financial Research at the Treasury Department, 
id. § 152(a), whose function is to provide research support for the Council, id. § 153(a). 
 342. Id. § 113 (Council ―threat‖ determination procedures and considerations); id. § 121 (Federal 
Reserve Board ―grave threat‖ determination procedures and considerations). 
 343. Id. §§ 114, 155, 166, 121. 
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an actual systemic crisis. Although it also establishes procedures for an 
official determination, which then triggers government intervention, the 
title II orderly liquidation procedure involves the government at a later 
stage—when the financial company is in default or danger of default and 
the failure of the company ―would have serious adverse effects on 
financial stability . . . .‖344 There is no turning back after a title II 
―systemic risk determination‖; the determination triggers appointment of 
the FDIC as receiver
345
 and begins the orderly liquidation process. Thus, 
the Act does not give the government the option to stabilize a failing 
institution through loans or equity investments.
 
 
Lest there be any doubt about the future of taxpayer-funded bailouts, 
the statute repeatedly says: ―no more.‖346 In the event that the title II 
orderly liquidation fund is insufficient, the FDIC is authorized to charge 
assessments against nonbank financial companies supervised by the 
Federal Reserve and bank holding companies with total combined assets 
of $50 billion or more.
347
 Although this assessment is not the ex ante 
―rainy day‖ fund that some might have preferred, it does impose the 
burden of paying for the orderly liquidation on a subset of taxpayers, 
rather than the general public.
348
 
Although I believe that more could have been achieved, I applaud 
Congress for coming together to enact major financial reform legislation 
in a difficult, partisan environment. Hopefully the economic monitoring 
and orderly liquidation provisions in the Wall Street Reform Act will be 
effective in preventing or mitigating any future grave economic distress. I 
fear, though, that this is wishful thinking. Efforts to impose bailout costs 
on a particular subgroup—rather than the general public—may not be 
effective, either because that subgroup itself has insufficient assets or 
because the subgroup has the political lobbying power to fight the 
 
 
 344. Id. § 203(b)(2). 
 345. Once the systemic risk determination is made, the company will either consent to the 
appointment of the FDIC as receiver, or the Treasury Secretary will petition the district court for an 
order to place the company under FDIC receivership. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A).  
 346. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text (Act preamble); see also Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 112(a)(1)(B) (Council‘s purpose is to eliminate 
expectations that government will shield companies from loss in the event of failure); id. § 166 
(authorizing regulations for early remediation of a Federal Reserve-supervised bank holding company, 
―except that nothing in this subsection authorizes the provision of financial assistance from the Federal 
Government‖); id. § 204(a)(1)(orderly liquidation authority to be exercised so that ―creditors and 
shareholders will bear the losses of the financial company‖); id. § 214(c) (―Taxpayers shall bear no 
losses from the exercise of any authority under this title.‖). 
 347. Id. § 210(o)(1)(A), (B). See also supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
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imposition of a special burden. Given what I see as the inevitability of at 
least some future general revenue bailouts—albeit very rare eventsthe 
―head-in-the-sand‖ approach taken by Congress is unfortunate. Pretending 
that there will never be another bailout simply leaves us less prepared 
when the next severe crisis hits. The challenge is to develop a procedure 
that leaves the government prepared, without creating any additional moral 
hazard. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The federal government‘s ad hoc and fragmented approach has made it 
extremely difficult to get a clear picture of aggregate spending dedicated 
to bailout-type relief. To make informed decisions about allocation of 
government bailout resources, policymakers should work with a federal 
budget that includes complete information about the relative costs of overt 
government bailout-type programs. Such complete budget information 
would include financial information for all overt programs, whether 
implemented through ―on-budget,‖ ―off-budget,‖ or ―off-off budget‖ 
entities. When rescue efforts include a long-term government ownership 
interest of particular companies, those companies should be incorporated 
into the budget. Also, to the extent possible, the accounting methodologies 
of different government agencies and programs should be harmonized so 
that Congress can make fair comparisons.  
In addition to preparing more inclusive and methodologically 
consistent budgets, Congress needs to improve its valuation 
methodologies. Some government programs involve greater financial risk 
than others, and some involve different subsidy rates. A one-size-fits-all 
approach to valuing troubled assets and government equity investments 
does not sufficiently account for variations in risk and does not indicate 
variations in the proportionate government subsidy cost for different 
programs or different beneficiaries within the same program. For 
programs that present greater valuation challenges, some budget 
accounting mechanism should be incorporated to reduce the pretense of 
precision and to acknowledge that some numbers are ―fuzzier‖ than others.  
With regard to more covert bailouts, Congress must first acknowledge 
and identify the various ways in which the federal government provides 
hidden bailouts, such as legislatively enacted tax expenditures, taxpayer-
friendly IRS interpretations, and other federal agency-provided regulatory 
relief. Once these more covert bailouts are identified, they too should be 
included in the federal budget. In addition to providing a truer measure of 
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bailout costs, this information will make the budget more transparent and 
expose potential inequities in the distribution of economic relief. 
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